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NOTES AND COMMENTS
"SUBSTANTIALLY TO LESSEN COMPETITION
CURRENT PROBLEMS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS
ALTHOUGH the antitrust laws of the United States police diverse business
activities, essentially they are variations on a single theme-the preservation
and promotion of a rationally competitive economy.' Monopoly market power
achieved by consolidation of competing units, an abuse which' characterized
the nineteenth-century "trust," was proscribed by the Sherman Act, as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court in 1904.2 But the Sherman Act could not attack
attainment of such power until the process was virtually completed.3 Conse-
1. See ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST RP. 1, 316-18, 334 (1.955) [hereinafter
cited as ATT'y GEN. REP.]; SrmoNs, EcoNomic POLICY FOR A F SoCIETY 43-44 (1948).
Generally, competition is subject to certain statutory proscriptions in order to ensure a
healthy atmosphere for its continued existence. Thus the qualification in text ("rational-
ly") acknowledges the laws' less than complete adherence to a philosophy of free and
open competition. See Levitt, The Dilemma of Antitrust Aims, 42 Am. EcON. REv. 893
(1952) (inherent hypocrisy in the antitrust laws' censure of competition's most successful
practitioners) ; Letwin, The Orighs of Antitrust Policy, 64 J. POL. ECON. 156, 158 (1956).
See also Pearsall v. Great No. Ry., 161 U.S. 646, 676-77 (1896); United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Robinson, Imperfect Competi-
tion Revisited, 63 EcONOMIC J. 579, 592 (1953). Moreover, unrestrained competition has
been deemed harmful in certain areas of the economy. See Clark, The Orientation of
Policy, 40 AM. EcoN. REv. 93 (Supp. 1950) ("Judging by existing laws and policies, the
American people do not want unrestricted competition in the sale of labor, in agriculture,
and in local trade."). See also Hale & Hale, Competition or Contrl-I: The Chaos in
the Cases, 106 U. PA. L. Rav. 641 (1958).
2. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (consolidation of two
railroads producing monopoly power held to violate Sherman Act) ; Handler, Industrial
Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COLUm. L. Ray. 179, 187-93 (1932) ; Canfield, The
Northern Securities Decision and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 4 iCoLuM. L. Rv. 315
(1904).
The passage of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1952), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V, 1958), was prompted by public antipathy
towards the trust. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 319
(1897) ; Hamilton, The Problem of Anti-Trust Reform, 32 CoLum. L. REv. 173 (1932) ;
Stocking, Attorney General's Committee's Report: The Businessmn's Guide Through
Antitrust, 44 GEo. L.J. 1, 2 n.3 (1955); THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
ORIGINATION OF AN AmERUCAN TRADITION (1954). For a description of the "trustification"
of American industry between 1898 and 1904, see HOFSTADTER, THE Aa OF REFoRM 168-
69, 225-54 (1955). It has been claimed, however, that the Sherman Act was directed to
the problem of oligopoly. MACHLuP, THE EcoNomics OF SELLERS' COMPETITION 350
(1952) [hereinafter cited as MACULUP]. Contra, Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by
Merger, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. 23, 32 (Supp. 1950).
3. The act did extend to giant corporations which, through (a) external expansion
by partnership, merger, and combination with both competing and noncompeting concerns,
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quently, courts were confronted with the task of dismembering hugh corpora-
tions, and effective enforcement was deterred by fear that dissolution would
result in economic disruption.4 To remedy this and other weaknesses of the
Sherman Act, Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914. Section 7 of the act
was specifically directed at the evils of competitor acquisition.5
The section's promise lay in its adoption of an incipiency doctrine; the prob-
ability of substantial injury to competition was prohibited, and the need to
show that fullblown monopoly power would result from a corporate consolida-
tion was eliminated. 6 Three different criteria for the illegality of a merger
were provided. The first, whether a merger's effect "may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation . . . acquired and the corporation
making the acquisition," evoked the most judicial discussion and confusion.
Unworkable if construed literally 7-- any merger eliminates competition "be-
tween" the consolidated corporations 8-the language was given effect only
and (b) internal expansion said to have been aided by predatory trade practices, had
achieved monopoly power. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 42-43, 75
(191.1) ; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). But serious doubts
arose after these cases as to the ability of the act to reach corporations of less than
monopoly power. See articles cited note 4 infra. These doubts were apparently confirmed
by subsequent Sherman Act litigation. See United States v. International Harvester Co.,
274 U.S. 693 (1927) ; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
4. See Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Phyrrhic Victories of
Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1 (1951); Bowman, Incipiency Mergers, and the Size Question:
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 1 ANTmusT BuLL. 533, 534 (1956) ; Dewey, Romance and
Realism in Antitrust Policy, 63 J. PoL. EcoN. 93, 99 (1955) ; Oppenheim, Timberg & Van
Cise, Divestiture as a Remedy Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
119 (1950); Wood, The Supreme Court and a Cfhanging Antitrust Cdncept, 97 U. PA.
L. REv. 309, 337-40 (1949).
5. Clayton Act, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The first paragraph read:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any
section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
See H.R. RaP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) ; S. RaP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1914) ; Levy, The Clayton Lawr--An Inperfect Supplenent to the Sherman Law, 3 VA.
L. REv. 411, 414 (1916) ; Stevens, The Clayton Act, 5 Am. EcoN. REv. 38 (Supp. 1915);
Irvine, The Uncertainties of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 28 (1929).
6. See Levy, supr. note 5; Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 613, 620 (1948) ; Comment, 39
YALE L.J. 1042 (1930).
7. See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524,
526-27 (2d Cir. 1958). In Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F.2d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 1925), rev'd on
other grounds, 272 U.S. 554 (1926), the court read the statute literally. After the FTC
found that two local Georgia meat packers acquired by Swift had previously competed
with Swift, the court did not inquire into the substantiality of their competition.
8. A stock acquisition by a holding company may be an exception. See Pennsylvania
R.R. v. ICC, 66 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1933), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 291 U.S.
651. (1934). See also Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656, 661 (3d Cir.
1931).
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when a substantial percentage of the total goods marketed by the acquired and
acquiring firms were sold in competition with each other.9 In other cases, the
"between" requirement was ignored, and the market shares of the corporations
were viewed in proportion to the total market; only when the merging firms
accounted for a substantial share of industry sales as a whole would illegality
follow. 10 The second and seldom-employed test was whether the result of the
merger "may be... to restrain commerce in any section or any community.""
Finally, the statute prohibited mergers the effect of which "may be to . . .
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."' 2 Generally, courts em-
phasized the significance of the merging firms in the industry under all tests;
liberally interpreting the statute, it was found, in a market of few sellers, that
a merger of corporations with seven per cent and five per cent of total indus-
try sales could violate the act.13
Despite its potential, section 7 did not become an important antitrust
weapon. Limited to mergers effected through stock acquisition-apparently
then the principal method of corporate consolidation 14-it was easily evaded
by merging through direct purchase of assets.15 Indeed, a stock acquisition
was beyond attack if converted to an asset acquisition anytime before the issu-
ance of the Government's divestment order.16 Eventually, even enforcement
9. Compare International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 299 (1930) (merger legal
since only 5% of the merging firms' products sold in competition) (alternative holding),
and United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd on
other grounds, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (competition between the acquiring and acquired firms
"trivial" and not substantial), with Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 65 F.2d
336, 340 (2d Cir. 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 291 U.S. 587 (1934) (merger illegal
since 59% of merging firms' sales competing), and Baltimore & O.,R.R., 152 I.C;C. 721,
726 (1929) (merger illegal when 91,% of acquired firm's business competitive with ac-
quiring firm's).
10. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 124 (N.D. Ohio
1935) ; Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656, 660 (3d Cir. 1931) (alternative
holding).
11. See National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 F. Supp. 4, 7 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
12. See V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Aluminum Co.
of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401, 407 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923);
ef. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 168-69 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
13. Vanadium-Alloys Steel Co., 18 F.T.C. 194, 203-04 (1934); see Arrow-Hart &
Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 65 F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 1933), rev'd on, other grounds,
291 U.S. 587 (1934) (merger illegal where merging firms made 24% of industry sales);
Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, supra note 12.
14. See KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYsTEM ch. 1 (1954) ; Comment,
52 COLUm. L. REV. 766, 768-69 (1952).
15. For an exposition of the various methods of merger, see U.S. FTC, REPORT ON
CorPoRATE MERGERS AND AcpUISITIONS ch. IV (1955). See also Fuld, Sone Practical
Aspects of a Merger, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1092 (1947).
16. See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); Thatcher
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
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agencies viewed section 7 as a dead letter.1 7 The proliferation of corporate
consolidations in the postwar years highlighted the need to strengthen the
statute. 8 Furthermore, oligopoly, a market structure characterized by a few
powerful sellers, was increasingly recognized as a detriment to competition,'0
and United States v. Columbia Steel Co.20 brought into bold relief the inability
of the Sherman Act to cope with mergers which resulted in fewness of producers.
Thus, in 1950, Congress attacked corporate consolidation with a "new"
section 7, not because of concern with the growth of monopoly, but in order
to stem the tide of increasing oligopoly.21
THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET
One crucial problem of interpretation of the new statute is market definition.
The interrelationship of market delineation and standards of illegality in
section 7 cases is readily apparent. By restricted definition, courts may con-
17. -See Hearing on H.R. Rep. No. 2734 Before a Subcommittee of the House Coln-
inittee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1949); TNEC, Final Report and Recoin-
inendations, SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1941); Hearings on H.R.
2357 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 66-86 (1945).
18. See generally U.S. FTC, REPORT ON CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION IN MANUFAC-
TURING (1954) ; BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPIMTION 1, 3, 40 (1936) ; Levi, The Anti-
trust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CHrL L. REv. 153, 166-72 (1947) ; Celler, Monopoly
and Small Business in the Year Ahead, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 375, 378 (1957) ; Hearings
on H.R. 1840, S. 11, and S. 780 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1956). In the period 1951-
1954, three corporate mergers occurred every two days, and half of all mergers involved
companies with over $10 million in assets. U.S. FTC, REPORT ON CoRaORATE MERGERS
AND AcQuIsITIONs ch. II (1955); see Harris, The Urge To Merge, Fortune, Nov. 1954,
pp. 102, 103 ("mergers of important U.S. industrial corporations are taking place at the
astonishing rate of about forty-five a month," and the value of assets combined equals
10% of the total for all United States industrial corporations) ; Bock, Mergers and Mar-
ket Size-1. Product Dimensions, 16 CONFERENCE BOARD Bus. RzcoD [hereinafter cited
as CONF. BD. Bus. REc.] 192, 193 (1959) (between Jan. 1, 1951, and Dec. 31, 1958, there
were 6,526 total or partial acquisitions recorded by the FTC) ; Mergers: An Analysis of
1958 Listings, 16 CONF. BD. Bus. REC. 238, 241 (1959) (1,116 firms were acquired in
1958 resulting in 822 consolidated units, almost 50% of which possess in excess of $10
million in assets). But see Wilcox, On the Alleged Ubiquity of Oligopoly, 40 Am. Ecor.
REv. 67, 73 (Supp. 1950).
19. See, e.g., FELLNER, CoIErTmoN AmONG THE: FEw (1949). For one description
of oligopoly, see MAcELup 34849, 352. See also Note, 64 YALE L.J. 1049 (1955).
20. 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (acquisition by U. S. Steel of a fabricating plant which
would have foreclosed 3% of the market for rolled steel to competition, and might have
resulted in U. S. Steel's controlling 24% of a fabricating market area, permitted). The
Court was cognizant of the philosophy of § 7 of the Clayton Act banning mergers sub-
stantially lessening competition, but did not view the antimerger statute as controlling. Id.
at 507 n.7. But see Note, 58 YALE L.J. 764 (1,949) (restricting the specific result of the
case to its "peculiar" facts). See also Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act:
Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. R a. 745, 788 (1949).
21. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952). The section now reads in part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
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struct product ("line of commerce") and geographic ("section of the coun-
try") markets far more concentrated, and in which the merging corporations
have a much larger share, than would appear if the markets were broadened
to include a greater variety of products or additional regions of the country.
Or, overly restrictive market definition may put the merging firms in separate
markets and unjustifiably frustrate the statute. A market definition which is
too broad may improperly dilute market shares and exonerate the merger or,
alternatively, exaggerate the power of the merging firms by including areas
and products in which they are sellers, but which are irrelevant to the com-
petitive impact of the consolidation.
The problem of market delineation is not unique to section 7 cases, but is
also of strategic importance in other antitrust litigation in which illegality is
related to the degree of power and concentration in markets. Thus, precedents
involving the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act 2 may be relevant
for section 7 purposes.2 3 The most fundamental inquiry in defining the ap-
propriate market in a merger case is whether the two firms are selling in com-
petition with each other. Only firms who sell competing goods in competing
places could, by combining, increase their power over price and entry. Ob-
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or part of
the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
The amendment's purpose, inter alit, was "to limit future increases in the level of
economic concentration resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions" S. REP. No.
1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); see H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1950) ; Celler, Monopoly and Small Business in the Year Ahead, 3 ANnTRTusT BurL
375, 379 (1957). For legislative history of new § 7, see Comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 444
(1951) ; Note, 52 COLTrum. L. REv. 766 (1952) ; cf. Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 613 (1948).
The amendment closed the asset loophole. Further, the market wherein competition
was to be measured was restated; no longer was competition between merging companies
determinative, see note 9 supra, but rather that throughout the relevant market. Finally,
Congress articulated its desire to have the statute apply to vertical and conglomerate as
well as horizontal mergers. See H.R. REP. No. 1,191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. supra; S. REP.
No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. mspra.
This Comment will treat only the subject of horizontal mergers and acquisitions, which
appear to be the chief concern of enforcement agencies. See Markham, Merger Policy
Under the New Section 7: A Sic-Year Appraisal, 43 VA. L. REv. 489, 513-18 (1957).
For descriptions of vertical and conglomerate mergers, see MACHLUP, THE PoLIMCAL
EcoNomY or MONOPOLY 81-126 (1952); U.S. FTC, REPORT ON THE ManGER MovEmENT
29-63 (194S).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Corp., 334 U.S. 495, 514 (1948) (Sher-
man Act § 1.); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404
(1956) (Sherman Act § 2) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 (1949)
(the Standard Stations case) (Clayton Act § 3).
23. But see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588, 592 n.34,
593 n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (doubting the applicability of Sherman Act market definition
precedents in § 7 eases).
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viously, firms are not competitors unless they sell products which, in the eyes
of buyers, are reasonably interchangeable. Thus, the courts have employed a
concept of product substitutability 24-the lawyers' version of the economists'
"cross elasticity of demand ''2 -as determinative of the product market. The
imponderables of classifying products as substitutable or nonsubstitutable have
been developed at some length by both courts 26 and commentators. 7 Less
attention has been accorded the equally important problem, especially under
section 7, of ascertaining the extent to which firms compete in the same sec-
tion of the country.
The only sections which are relevant for section 7 purposes are those in
which both merging firms are "significant market participants." In demarcat-
ing the outer limits of these sections, the courts have referred to the "area of
24. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404
(1956) (the Cellophane case) ("reasonable interchangeability . . . price, use and quali-
ties considered," is the test for defining the product market) ; United States v. E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1957) (the du Pont-General Motors
case) ("sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses ... constitute ... products sufficiently
distinct... to make them a 'line of commerce' within the meaning of the Clayton Act") ;
International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-52 (1959) (harmonizing
Cellophane and da Pont-General Motors and requiring "a sufficiently separate part of the
trade or commerce").
25. See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524,
530 (2d Cir. 1958) ("sensitivity to price change" relevant to determining "cross-elasticity
of demand") ; STIGLER, THE THEORy OF PRtcE 48-49 (rev. ed. 1952) ("The cross-elasticity
. . . defines economic substitution . . . [and] provides a convenient basis for defining a
commodity .... ").
26. Section 7 cases discussing this issue include United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1957) (other finishes and fabrics not substitutable
for automotive finishes and fabrics); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American
Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 1958) (beet sugar substitutable for cane sugar);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 591-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(various types of steel pipe not substitutable; nonferrous metal and plastic pipe not sub-
stitutable for steel pipe; used oil field equipment not substitutable for new oil field equip-
ment) ; Erie Sand & Gravel Co., TRADE REG. REI'. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 11 27644, at
36812 (Dec. 17, 1958) (pit sand not substitutable for lake sand) ; Brillo Mfg. Co., No.
6557, FTC, Nov. 26, 1958, at 2-3 (other industrial abrasives not substitutable for steel
wool); Crown Zellerbach Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 1 26923, at
36458-59 (1957) ("trade coarse paper" including paperboard not substitutable for "Census
coarse paper," including wrapping papers, bag and sack papers, and converting papers).
27. See, e.g., Bock, supra note 18; Gesell, Legal Problents Involved in Proving Rele-
vant Markets, 2 ANTITRuST BULL. 463 (1957) ; Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cello-
phane Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281, 308-13 (1956); Comment, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 1269,
1272-77 (1958); Note, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 580, 585-94 (1954) (collecting earlier cases
and authorities).
28. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299-300 n.5 (1949) (the Stand-
ard Stations case) (petroleum products in seven-state "Western area" in Clayton Act § 3
action); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 595-96 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (series of regional markets in steel industry) ; see S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-6 (1950) (citing Standard Stations criteria).
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effective competition," 28 or the "natural selling area."29 But how may courts
distinguish the "effective" from the ineffective, or the "natural" from the
unnatural? To begin the inquiry, a producer is a "market participant" wher-
ever he may sell without facing disabling competitive disadvantages in relation
to other producers. The producer's "significance" in the geographic market
varies in direct proportion with the magnitude of its selling capabilities in re-
lation to rival plants. In defining relevant geographic sections, the most im-
portant of these capabilities is transportation costs from plant to market lower
than or equal to those of competitors. 30
If the enterprise is one in which freight is a proportionately insignificant
cost, the complexities of delimiting an appropriate geographic market do not
arise. Nonfreight advantages are reflected nationally; profits and sales can be
uniform throughout the country. Thus, the market for jewelled watches has
been held to be nationwide.31 Even with such products, particularly effective
salesmen or advertising may, at least temporarily, render a producer dominant
in a particular regional area. But such a firm is not insulated from compet-
ing producers by freight costs, and any competitor might be able to dilute its
market share in a relatively short period of time; an attempt to raise prices
in the favored area would hasten this result. The geographic region relevant
to a particular producer's competitive status should not, therefore, be restricted
to a particular area on such transitory grounds.
In industries in which freight costs are important-such as those which
produce goods of low value in relation to high bulk-a plant may be able to
serve only particular areas effectively. To define the relevant geographic mar-
ket for firms in such industries, courts must therefore draw a line, represent-
ing the outer limits of the region in which the plant is a significant market
participant, around each plant of the merging companies. Participation will
diminish in rough accordance with freight costs to various destinations from
the plant. But the region in which a plant participates is determined not by
transportation costs alone, but by freight combined with other factors. Lower
production costs, more efficient management and organization, greater good
will, improved process, more harmonious labor relations, better distributional
outlets, or access to raw materials will increase a firm's ability to make sales,
29. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387,
397-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 1958) (refined sugar in ten-
state "River Territory"); Crown Zellerbach Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC
Cas.) 1" 26923, at 36459 (1957) (eleven-state Western area the "natural market" for "coarse
paper products").
30. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 514, 529 (1948) (eleven-ste
Western area for semifinished steel products in Sherman Act § 1 proceeding) ; American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., supra note 29, at 398, 259 F.2d at 529;
Crown Zellerbach Corp., supra note 29, at 36459.
In the case of foodstuffs, perishability may also be a crucial factor limiting the area
of shipment. Note, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 580, 597-98 (1954).
31. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 311 (D. Conn),
aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
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and thus allow it to compete in a given area with rivals who confront lower
freight costs but who have fewer nonfreight advantages, or who are taking a
higher profit per unit sold.32 And no fixed guide is available for determining
where participation is so diminished as to be irrelevant under the statute.33
Concrete facts, in addition to freight costs, on which to base this determina-
tion are the plant's complete costs and records of the plant's past shipments
to various points. Past shipment figures may present an imperfect picture of
past sales when they show fluctuating demand among scattered buyers, reflect
temporary shortages, or are available only on the basis of state political boun-
daries, which are unrelated to product distribution patterns. 34
Information on a plant's costs may be even less useful in delineating the
relevant region for section 7 purposes. Bare cost data does not encompass all
the factors which determine the market strength in a given area.35 In addition,
the cost data of different firms may be too complex and variegated to permit
a proper estimate of the selling capabilities one firm may have in a particular
locality.3 6 For example, it is not ineluctably true that a firm which operates
at less than full capacity, and therefore does not sell in a distant region, is at
a permanent competitive disadvantage in that region, when compared with a
firm whose cost savings derived from full-capacity operations allow it to reach
faraway sections of the country.3 Normally, therefore, past shipments will
serve as the best measure of the region of significant market participation.33
Once the court has set forth regions representing the significant participa-
tion of each plant, the regions where merging firm A overlaps merging firm
32. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 599 n.44
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (lower cost production enables plant to overcome freight cost barriers).
33. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1950); United States v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., supra note 32, at 602.
34. See ibid. ("there is nothing sacred about the boundary lines of a state"). But in
most cases where regional markets are appropriate only statewide figures are available.
See cases cited notes 28-30 supra.
35. See text at note 33 mtpra.
36. One of the myriad factors which must be considered is variations in available
transportation rates. For example, Bethlehem's Maryland plant ships steel products via
the Panama Canal to the West Coast, and is a significant market participant in that area.
168 F. Supp. at 600. Midcontinent plants, because of higher rail charges, are impotent in
the Far West. Brief for Defendants, June 23, 1958, pp. 36-3S.
37. In Bethlehem, the court found that fuller capacity operations allowed Bethlehem
consistently to ship into the midcontinent area from distant Eastern plants, 168 F. Supp.
at 599.
38. The courts and FTC have relied almost wholly on records of past shipments. See,
e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 601-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ;
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 390-91.
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 1958) ; Crown Zellerbach Corp., TRADE
REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ff 26923, at 36459 (1957) ; Comment, 58 COLtM. L. REV.
1269, 1271-72, 1278 (1958) ("The most direct method of proving the probability of a
substantial lessening of competition is to show that in a particular area, a substantial per-
centage of the total sales made are made by each of the combining companies.").
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B constitute the sections in which consolidated AB would acquire enhanced
market participation. The areas of overlap are thus relevant geographic mar-
kets in which to apply section 7 tests of illegality. 9 And in implementing the
statute's mandate that a merger is illegal if competition is likely to be sub-
stantially lessened in "any" section of the country, a court would be justified
in defining more restrictive markets within the areas of overlap.40  In the
widest areas in which both firms effectively sell without facing disabling com-
petitive disadvantage, the firms may not have sufficient overall market power
to warrant prohibition of the merger. Nevertheless, within the overlap area,
a narrower region may exist in which the merging firms have significant ad-
vantages over all others. Thus, a merger may involve a substantial lessening
of competition in a particular region, even though the effects of the consoli-
dation throughout the entire overlap area are not anticompetitive. The ques-
tion then arises as to the extent to which smaller areas, in which plants of
the merging firms have particular advantages, should be deemed relevant mar-
kets for the purposes of section 7. Again, no fixed rule determines whether
a particular cluster of buyers constitutes a "section of the country." But too
39. In Bethlehem, the court adopted a nationwide market in which the share of the
merging firms (about 21%) exceeded their share in most regional markets. 168 F. Supp.
at 594, 597-98, 602. In future cases, a nationwide market for such products, including
areas in which neither firm has made or appears capable of making shipments, could
result in unwarranted exoneration of the merger. In American Crystal Sugar, the court
referred to the nationwide status of the merging firms, 152 F. Supp. at 397, but measured
the competitive consequences only in a ten-state section; indeed, a nationwide market prob-
ably would have resulted in no violation. But the Bethlehem court's finding of a nation-
wide market, particularly for pig iron and raw steel ingot (included in the "iron and
steel industry" product market, 168 F. Supp. at 594) appears more appropriate in view
of the vertical aspects of the merger, id. at 611-14, and the high degree of vertical in-
tegration of the merging firms and the industry as a whole. Control of iron ore supplies,
see note 245 infra, and the effect upon national buyers were important, 168 F. Supp. at
611 (shipments by Bethlehem and Youngstown to "common customers" in Michigan and
Ohio-primarily the national automobile producers-represented 40% of their combined
sales in those states). See Pillsbury Co., 3 TRADE REG. Riw. ff 27846, at 36917 (FTC
March 11, 1959) ("the necessary tendency ... [of the horizontal acquisition] is to pre-
vent the smaller ... manufacturers from selling their products to chain stores and super-
markets").
40. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 603 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (in addition to nation as a whole, the following regional areas held relevant for
semifinished steel products: the northeast quadrant of the United States; Michigan, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and New York; Michigan and Ohio; Michigan; and Ohio); American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958) (in addition to the ten-state "river territory," a three-state
area within that territory is of "economic significance" and conforms to "commercial
realities"); Crown Zellerbach Corp., TRADE IEG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ff 26923
(1957) (within eleven-state Western area the "evidence is .. .sufficient to show that the
three Pacific Coast states, California, Oregon, and Washington, constitute a section of the
country, within the meaning of Section 7") ; Bock, Mergers and Market Size-2. Geo-
graphic Dimensions, 16 CoNF. BD. Bus. REc. 285, 286 (1959).
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narrow market delineation could ban all but the most trivial mergers, 41 a re-
sult apparently not intended by Congress.4 2
THE RELEVANCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE
Once the market is defined, the problem of measuring the effect of a merger
on competition is confronted. Aside from revealing an early emphasis on mar-
ket structure, old section 7 decisions provide slight assistance to courts seek-
ing the meaning of "may be substantially to lessen competition. '43 Judicial
construction of equivalent language in section 3 of the act is also of little
value. The substantiality of lessened competition in tying clauses or require-
ments contracts under section 3 has been determined primarily by the extent
to which competitors may be foreclosed from the relevant market-an analysis
of perhaps dubious relevance in cases of horizontal merger, where there is no
foreclosure.4 4 Accordingly, some reliable criteria must presently be devised to
measure the competitive significance of horizontal mergers.
Seeking to establish an adequate basis for prediction to facilitate section 7
enforcement, and provide clear guides to businessmen for evaluating the legal-
ity of a contemplated merger, commentators have proposed a test embodying
aspects of a "quantitative substantiality" rule originally associated with section
3.45 Under a section 7 quantitative test, the market shares of the merging
corporations would command principal emphasis, and a prima facie violation
would exist whenever these combined reveal too high a percentage of market
41. Seemingly too narrow market definition had the opposite result in Transamerica
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901
(1953). The local community in which each acquired commercial bank was located was
deemed a separate market. Since the acquired banks were thus viewed as noncompetitive,
the Federal Reserve Board's finding that the challenged acquisitions were leading "to-
ward a monopoly in banking" in a five-state area was rejected. Id. at 169. But enhanced
control of commercial bank credit would not seem limited to local communities, and such
narrow market definition is questionable.
42. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 595 (1957).
43. See cases cited notes 9, 10, 13 supra.
44. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (the Standard
Stations case) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ; Comment,
58 CoLtm. L. REv. 1269, 1281 n.77 (1958) ; Levi, The du Pont Case and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 3 ANT rRUST BULL. 3, 7 (1958) ; cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Federal Trade Commission has distinguished § 3 as follows:
"While both sections are designed to protect the competitive process, they reach this goal
by different routes-one by protecting the seller and buyer segment of our economy, the
other by protecting competition on an over-all basis." Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555,
563 (1953). On tests of illegality of tying clauses under § 3, see Bowman, Tying Arrange-
inents and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Turner, Tle Validity of
Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1959).
45. See Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition-The Impact of Standard
Oil Co. of California v. United States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clayton
Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10 (1949) ; Levi, supra note 44, at 7. But see Handler, Qzan-
titative Substantiality and the Celler-Kefauver Act-A Look at the Record, 7 MERCER
L. REV. 279 (1956).
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control.40 Other factors would be pertinent only when percentages fall short
of a predetermined minimum. 47 Advocates of a "qualitative" test, on the other
hand, would consider such elements as ease of entry of new firms into the
market, the general increase in industry concentration, the history of the in-
dustry's merger activity, economies of scale, and the degree of price and qual-
ity competition, in addition to market structure, in all merger cases. 48
While the Federal Trade Commission in Pillsbury Mills, Inc.49 viewed
quantitative analysis as a refutation of its own expertise, and asserted the
need for complete economic analysis in order to determine a merger's com-
petitive effects,50 later cases have turned primarily on considerations of mar-
ket share.';' Similarly, the courts have underscored the relevance of market
46. See Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176
(1955); Bowman, Towards Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1953), Note, 44
GEo. L.J. 478 (1956) (illustrating several varieties of quantitative tests).
47. See Stigler, supra note 46, at 182. His proposed standards are:
1. There should be a presumption that every firm with less than five to ten per
cent of an industry's output (after merger) may engage in the merger. Within this
range, the percentage should be lower, the larger the industry.
2. Every merger by a firm which possesses one-fifth or more of an industry's
output after the merger shall be presumed to violate the statute.
3. In situations that lie between these limits, the merger should be investigated
by the enforcement agencies if the aggregate annual sales of the merging firms will
exceed some absolute level-say five million dollars-after merger. Its legality
should be judged along the lines discussed above.
Ibid.
48. See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 574-75 (1953) (concurring opinion);
HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 69-70 (1957); Arr'y GEN. REP. 125-27; Barnes,
Competitive Mores And Legal Tests, 46 GEo. LJ. 577, 620, 629 (1958) ; Barnes, Markets,
Competition, and Monopolistic Tendencies in Merger Cases, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 41 (1956).
But courts seem increasingly aware that the crux of the quantitative-qualitative dispute
actually is the weight properly attributable to market shares, not the general relevance
of other factors in differing market contexts. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 576, 603 n.51 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where the court characterized the dispute
as a "battle of words."
49. 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
50. Id. at 565. This disposition of the case received frank criticism. See BURNS, A
STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAws 325-27 (1958). Recently, the Commission reached the
merits of the case and ordered divestiture of the acquired assets. Pillsbury Co., 3 TRADE
REG. REP. ff 27845 (FTC March 11, 1959).
51. See Crown Zellerbach Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ir 26923
(1957) (barring merger of large paper producer with 51.5% of the relevant market and
competitor with an 11% market share); Farm Journal, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1956-
1957 FTC Cas.) ff 26023 (1956) ; Erie Sand & Gravel Co., TRADE: REG. REP. (1957-1958
FTC Cas.) ff 27644 (Nov. 26, 1958) (lake sand producer with 37% of market ordered
to divest itself of the assets of a competitor with 55%; initial order).
Consent decrees have been ordered in several cases. See Scovill Mfg. Corp., TRADE
REG. REP. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) ff 26206 (1956) ; International Paper Co., TRADE REG.
REP. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) ff 26258 (1956); Vendo Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958
FTC Cas.) IT 26724 (1957).
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structure. 2 This emphasis assumes a determinable relationship between mar-
ket structure and competition. For antitrust purposes, competition may be
measured by the degree to which persons selling in the same geographic and
product markets attempt through rivalry to preserve and increase their profits
by maintaining and augmenting their market share.53  Attempts to develop
and offer goods and services of superior quality are one type of competitive
activity; another is the offering of more attractive prices.54 Experimentation
and innovation in order to reduce costs preliminary to lower prices or a higher
profit margin are additional reflections of competition. Conversely, events
which produce a slackening of innovation, a stabilization of price-in general,
which cause a reduction in efforts to increase market share at the expense of
competitors-tend to lessen competition.
The Theory
That market structure may affect the level of competitive activity has been
demonstrated by theoretical and empirical studies. 5 Competition is likely to
52. See United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799
(D.D.C. 1.958), appeal docketed, 27 U.S.L. WEPH, 3340 (U.S. May 22, 1959) (1958 Term,
No. 942) (agency making 86% of all milk sales to dealers in Washington, D.C., metro-
politan area prohibited under § 7 from acquiring dairy with 9.5% of such sales) ; E. L.
Bruce Co. v. Empire Millwork Corp., 164 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (merger result-
ing in unit controlling 12% of the hardwood flooring sales in the United States approved
since there were 170 competing producers) ; Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn. 1953), aft'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) (nation's 4th largest
watch manufacturer with 11% of dollar volume sales granted an injunction against
further acquisition of its stock by the 5th leading producer with 9.5% of sales).
,Consent decrees have been ordered in several cases. See United States v. Minute Maid
Corp., 1955 Trade Cas. 70673 (S.D. Fla. 1955) (divesting some acquisitions and pro-
hibiting any in the future without court approval) ; United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
1956 Trade Cas. 71.171 (N.D. Il. 1956) (divesting two hotel chains of one hotel in each
of three cities and barring future acquisitions in those cities for five years) ; United
States v. General Shoe Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 71227 (M.D. Tenn. 1956) ; United States
v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 74538 (D. Utah 1958) ; cf. MASON, Eco-
NOMIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 328 (1957).
53. See generally Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON.
REv. 241 (1940); Arr'v GEN. REP. 318-19; CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC
COMPETITION (7th ed. 1956); ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF ImPERECT CoMrIPETION
(1934) ; Stocking, On the Concept of Workable Competition as an Antitrust Guide, 2
ANTITRUST BULL. 3, 4 (1956); Mason, Monopoly in Law and Ecomwmics, 47 YALE L.J.
34 (1937); Brems, Cartels and Competition, 66 WELTWITSCArlICHEs ARcHlv. 54
(1951), cited in MACBLUP 435.
54. See A-r'v GEN. REP. 320.
55. See BURNS, TE DECLINE OF COMPETION 229 (1936); CHAMBERLIN, op. cit.
supra note 53, ch. 3; U.S. FTC, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUM'MARY REPORT 68
(1948); NICHOLLS, PRICE POLICIES IN THE CIGARETITE INDUSTRY (1951); WESTON, THE
ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE Fnus (1953); WILCOX, COMPETITION AND
MONOPOLY IN AmERICAN INDUSTRY (TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1941).
Emphasis on the market share of a corporation in determining whether its existence
violates the antitrust laws, as in cases under Sherman Act § 2, rather than on exercise
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be greatest when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant
market share.50 Here, when individual firms strive to increase market shares,
their competitive moves affect the shares of the others only slightly. Rivals
will see little need to respond by equivalent action, and firms need not antici-
pate that their selling efforts will be nullified by industrywide imitation.
Hence, competitive activities in an unconcentrated market will not be impeded
by fears of duplication or retaliation.
But, in overly concentrated markets, which section 7 was designed to pre-
vent, any attempt by one seller to increase its market share threatens signifi-
cantly to decrease the shares of every other.5 7 In order to preserve their mar-
ket positions, these competitors will find it imperative to match any competi-
tive move. The oligopolist, faced with the probability of parallel action by
rival sellers, may recognize that his best course lies in abstention from com-
petition."8 For if one seller's efforts are adopted by all, everyone's profit is
of the power conferred by that share, represents a preference for the "structure" theory,
which grew prominent in a monopoly context.
Under the structure theory behavior is irrelevant: the law proscribes monopoly
itself and not merely monopolization; it reaches the fact of market power rather
than the manner of its exercise. The term "structure" is derived from the fact that
the theory involves analysis of the composition of a market for a specific product
in a given geographic area, including computation of the number of sellers and
the like. In short, the test involves finding the defendant's "share of the market."
HALE & HAL, MAR ET PowER: SIzE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN Acr 89 (1958);
see Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct, 46 Am. EcoN. Rzv. 471 (Supp. 1956)
(dividing line in determining merger legality must turn on conceptions of market power) ;
Stigler, The Case Against Big Business, Fortune Magazine, May 1952, pp. 123, 167 (the
problem is market control, and until it is decided how much is permissible, the situation
will remain confused).
56. See MACHLUP 334-36 (listing six major benefits of many-seller competition);
BAIN, BARIUERS TO NEW COMPETITION 27 (1956). But see Clark, Toward a Cotwept of
Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REv. 241, 256 (1940) (oligopoly with quality dif-
ferentials results in some of the healthiest cases of workable competition in large-scale
industry). See also Robinson, The Impossibility of Competition, in MONOPOLY AND CoM-
PETITION AND THEIR REGULATION 245 (Chamberlin ed. 1954); Arr'Y GEN. REP. 325.
57. See id. at 326. See generally FELLNER, COmPmrITION AMONG THE Fraw (1949)
[hereinafter cited as FELLNER]. For purposes of this Comment, markets composed of
a few large sellers plus an indeterminate number of small firms will also be classified as
oligopolies, as well as those composed only of a few sellers. While studies of "partial
oligopoly" structure are few in number, and largely speculative in conclusions, they tend
to indicate that small firms exist by sufferance. And entry of new firms may be possible,
though only on a small scale. Within restricted areas, then, the smaller firms may be able
to compete, and grow, as long as they do not appear substantially to encroach on the
market shares of the larger. See Bain, Conditions of Entry and the Entergence of
Monopoly, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULATION 215, 221 (Chamber-
lin ed. 1954); FELLNER 136-41; MAcHLUP 496 ("partial oligopoly" may evidence price
leadership in the same manner as pure oligopoly).
58. See BAIN, BARRIES To NEw CompETION 27 (1956); FEL.NER 33; MAcHLUP
445 (characterizing the thoughts of an oligopolist: "We all pull our punches, if we punch
at all."). But see KAPLAN, BIa ENTERPuSE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSEM 102-03 (1954)
(oligopoly is not incompatible with active price competition).
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lowered, while no one's market share is increased. For example, an oligopolist
may fear that a unilateral price reduction will be met with retaliatory price
cuts and open price warfare.59
But oligopolists will abstain from competitive pricing only if each is aware
that all others view the avoidance of price-cutting as a method of profit maxi-
mization.6 ° Price competition will generally occur in the "best" of oligopolies
since the imperfection of a seller's knowledge of his rival's intent may lead to
"protective" price reductions, even though others may not have attempted in-
roads on his market share.6 ' Nevertheless, the very fewness of participants
makes it easier for one oligopolist reasonably to know what others will do.
And the few sellers may be able, by implied agreement or consciously parallel
action, to ensure uniform price movements-an "administered price" system. -2
Such a system is paced by an industry "leader," leading in that, with the con-
sent of his fellow sellers, he may alter his price confident that the group will
follow suit.6 3 The leader is likely to be the largest seller within the oligopoly,
although more refined techniques may yield rotating leadership so as to avoid
glaringly collusive behavior. 64 Leadership permits an otherwise static industry
to increase prices; in its absence, no seller could be sure that a unilateral in-
crease in price would be duplicated by other sellers. He would therefore re-
frain from such independent action, since it might decrease his market share
to the benefit of his rivals. Oligopoly structure thus enables sellers collectively
to impose higher prices, with resulting injury to buyers. Some would also
argue that oligopoly-fostered "administered prices" increase inflationary ten-
dencies in the economy as a whole.65
59. See BRE S, PRODUCT EQUILIBRIUM UNDER MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 203-04
(Harvard Studies in Monopoly and Competition No. 5, 1951) ; CHAMBERLIN, Op. Cit.
supra note 53, at 51-53 (discussing causes of uncertainty of competitors as to the re-
sponses his competitive moves will evoke) ; Robinson, supra note 56, at 246 (citing the
enormous cost of oligopolistic warfare) ; Schneider, Real Economies of Integration and
Large-Scale Production versus Advantages of Domination, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETI-
TION AND THEIR REGULATION 208 (Chamberlin ed. 1954) (oligopoly wars can prove fatal
even to large firms).
60. See BREMS, op. cit. supra note 59, at 232; MACIILUP 437-38; HALE & HALE, op.
cit. supra note 55, at 131; FELLNER 33.
61. See FELLNER 178-79. Moreover, periodic "testing" of a seller's market strength
may occur, either after a merger or series thereof, or incidental to implementation of a
cost-saving device. And psychological factors may make for competition where none was
sought. See also Morgenstern, Oligopoly, Monopolistic Competition, and the Theory of
Games, 38 Am. EcoN. REV. 10, 14-15 (Supp. 1948).
62. Fellner, Collusion and Its Limits Under Oligopoly, 40 Am. EcoN. Rv. 54 (Supp.
1950) ; Robinson, Imperfect Competition Revisited, 63 ECONOMIC J. 579, 588 (1953) ; cf.
Morgenstern, supra note 61, at 14-15.
63. See FELLNER 120-36 (leadership often implies collusion) ; MACHLUP 493; CHAm-
BERLIN, op. cit. supra note 53, at 46-51.
64. See MACHLuP 491-95, 500-01.
65. See Lerner, Halting the Current Recession, 25 COMIrSENTAnRy 110 (1958) ; Means,
The New-Style "Administrative" Inflation, New Republic, May 4, 1959, p. 9; Dale, De-
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A further condition of a completely noncompetitive oligopoly is the ability
of sellers to avoid tampering with each other's market shares. 6 When cus-
tomers are individual accounts, associated with particular firms through a
course of dealing, maintenance of market share is facilitated by tacit under-
standing that the various sellers shall not try to woo other companies' cus-
tomers. This practice of live-and-let-live is feasible, in the absence of formal
agreement or understanding, only in a market of few sellers. Of course, in the
case of consumer goods advertised and sold to unidentified members of the
general public, the practice is, absent market division, not possible even in an
oligopolistic market. 7
Wide agreement exists on oligopoly's undesirable impact on price competi-
tion.08 But such a market structure may also adversely affect innovation and
quality competition. In a wide segment of the economy, however, encompass-
ing standardized products such as raw materials, commodities and many semi-
finished goods, buyers either do not desire innovation or are unable to recog-
nize quality differences, and quality competition is not to be expected regard-
less of market structure. 9 And in the case of most nonstandardized products,
shifting buyer tastes, fear that close substitute products will be introduced, and
rapid technological change drive even oligopolists to innovation of product
and process.70 Moreover, the time lag before rivals are able to duplicate quality
changes-in contrast to the immediate response evoked by price changes-may
allow oligopolists to capture a greater percentage of the market through prod-
uct innovation.71
On the other hand, in the area of products which are neither wholly stand-
ardized nor threatened by substitutes, and in which only easily duplicated
quality changes are feasible, oligopolists may abstain from quality competition
for the same reason they do not independently vary price-unwillingness to
undertake costly innovation which may not add to market share.72 In addi-
bate on "Administered Prices," New York Times, March 22, 1959, § 4, p. 7, col. 3; cf.
NEAL, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND PRICE INFLEXIBILITY 166 (1942) (concentration
tends to accentuate depressions) ; Galbraith, Market Structure and Stabilization Policy,
39 REv. ECorOMICS & STATISTICS 124 (1957) (a concentrated market structure diminishes
effectiveness of government monetary and fiscal policy in controlling inflation) ; Admin-
istered Prices Reconsidered, 49 Am. EcoN. REv. 419 (Supp. 1959).
For the various views on this issue see the testimony of economists in the recent
Senate hearings on administered prices. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 231 and S. Res.
57 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 9 & 10 (1959).
66. See MACHLUP 363.
67. See Fellner, supra note 62, at 55-56.
68. See authorities cited notes 57-67 supra.
69. See Scitovsky, Ig rance as a Source of Oligopoly Power, 40 Am. EcoN. REV.
48, 50 (Supp. 1950).
70. See notes 140-41 infra.
71. See CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 53, at 52; Bain, supra note 57, at 229; cf.
MACHLUP 457.
72. Id. at 460.
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tion, oligopoly structure may facilitate suppression of product improvements 73
which, because of greater durability, might reduce the volume of industry sales.
It has been argued, however, that oligopoly facilitates product and process
improvements. 74 Nevertheless, no empirical evidence exists to show that in-
novation has been either more or less prevalent in industries bearing traits of
oligopoly.
Whether fewness of sellers will cause noncompetitive behavior is also par-
tially dependent on the ease with which new firms may enter the market.75
The possibility of successful entry keeps existing sellers' prices down since
potential competitors might well capture demand if they could readily under-
sell established firms.70 Sluggishness in quality improvements and innovations
may similarly be prevented by easy entry.77 Arguably, even in concentrated
industries, a level of competition comparable to that expected in a market of
many sellers may be thus attained, if sufficient ease of entry exists. Ease of
entry is a function of ease of attaining such factors as distribution systems,
sources of supply, necessary capital, good will, technological skills, and pat-
ents. 78 And good evidence that entry is easy-a difficult proposition to estab-
lish in the abstract--exists in a record of actual successful entry in the past.
Consequently, a showing that entry is easy may weaken an inference that a
merger which increases concentration substantially lessens competition.79
It must be remembered, however, that a particular merger may restrict
previously easy entry; when the resulting entity achieves greatly increased
market power, the chances of a new firm's success may be jeopardized. At
any rate, the possibility of new entrants is but one stimulus to competition.
Another is the activity in which each existing firm engages, or is capable of
engaging. When both of these stimuli are present, competition may be greater
than when only one is present. Accordingly, elimination of a competitor may
substantially lessen competition even though ease of entry is still present.
Ease of entry may, however, suggest that new firms will "replace" the com-
petitor lost by the merger.80 These new entrants may well introduce vigorous
73. Id. at 458; see note 144 infra.
74. See notes 140-41 infra and accompanying text.
75. See Bain, Workable Competition in Oligopoly, 40 Am. EcoN. REV. 35, 42 (Supp.
1950). But see Robinson, supra note 62, at 579. Free entry to the market has been defined
as a condition in which long-run costs of new entrants would be equal to those of firms
already in the industry. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Am. EcON. REV.
23, 27 (Supp. 1950). Entry conditions have been minimized by economists, however, who
have concluded that, theoretically, restricted entry may be quite compatible with perfect
competition. See Robinson, What Is Perfect Competition?, 49 Q.J. Ecox. 104-11 (1934);
CHA'mBERT N, op. cit. supra note 53, at 200.
76. See Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 Am. EcoN. Rv.
448, 452 (1-949).
77. Cf. Bain, supra note 57, at 226.
78. For a compilation of circumstances creating barriers to entry, see id. at 226-27.
79. See Bain, supra note 75, at 36 (fairly satisfactory competitive results may emerge
due to a long-run threat of entry).
80. The replacement theory has been offered by litigants in several cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; Crown
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competition to the market. For while present firms may have something to
gain from preservation of the status quo, new firms can survive only by win-
ning customers away from current suppliers or finding outlets undiscovered
by older rivals. And this must be accomplished by those activities which char-
acterize competition.8 ' On the other hand, it is possible that the merger may
cause or increase the industry's oligopolization, and that new entrants will find
it necessary, in order to survive, to adhere to the new pattern. Additionally,
new entry may not provide a competitive stimulus equal to that of the ab-
sorbed unit when the acquired firm was an important competitive force in the
market. For new entrants may be capable only of achieving a small share of
the market successfully.8 2 For example, a new firm's lack of established good
will may render it an unsuccessful competitor.8 3 Finally, if the absorbed unit
was of considerable competitive significance, the likelihood of its "replace-
ment" may be too conjectural to refute a finding of illegality established on
other grounds.
Viewing new entrants as replacements for section 7 purposes is acceptance
of a theory that the statute will be violated only when competition after the
merger may be substantially less than competition before the merger-a "be-
fore-after" test. Another interpretation would find a violation whenever
postmerger competition may be less than what probably would have existed
but for the merger-a "but for" test. Under the latter theory, defendants in
section 7 actions could not use the replacement factor to offset the competition
lost as a result of the merger. Usually, both tests will produce the same result,
since courts would probably presume that the level of premerger competition
would have remained constant but for the merger. But when defendants show
not only that conditions of easy entry deny the probability of lost competition,
but also that such easy entry will produce, or actually has produced, a unit
replacing whatever competition may have been eliminated by the suspect merg-
er, utilization of the before-after test would produce no violation. The pres-
ence of a new entrant, which substitutes its competitive force for that elimi-
nated by the merger, bars any finding that competition before the merger was
greater than that at time of suit. Under a but-for test, however, such a show-
ing would not exonerate the defendant. The replacement unit would have pre-
sumably entered the market irrespective of the merger, and, it could be as-
sumed, would have raised the level of market competition had there been no
Zellerbach Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) f[ 26923, at 36460 (1957) ; cf.
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 400 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957); Pillsbury Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. f[ 27845 (FTC March 11, 1959).
81. See text at notes 53-54 supra.
82. See BAIN, BARRiERs To Nmv CoMPEmpTION 12 (1956) (listing existing firms'
possible advantages over potential entrants). Bain further points to the possibility that
easy entry may remedy an oligopolistic structure only temporarily. New entrants would
initially ease concentration, but in time, sellers' combinations would re-aggravate market
structure and return it to oligopoly. Id. at 34.
83. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781., 797 (1946).
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merger. Thus, illegality could be found if there is a substantial difference be-
tween the degree of competition that would have existed had there been entry
of a replacement unit and no merger, and the degree of competition at time
of suit. Nevertheless, the speculative nature of replacement minimizes the
significance of the theoretical distinction between the two tests. Entry on a
scale equal to that of the absorbed firm is conjectural, and could be proved
only long after the merger, when the actual replacement could be identified.
Since concentration influences the degree of competitive activity likely or
possible in a market, competition will be affected by changes in concentration
produced by a merger.8 4 Before illegality obtains, however, it must be shown
not only that competition may be lessened, but that the threatened lessening
is "substantial." If "substantiality" is defined solely in terms of the amount
of change in competitive activity likely to be wrought by a merger, an unhappy
situation results. For, while a merger likely to change a vigorously competitive
market into one only moderately competitive would properly be held illegal,
an acquisition which took a seriously uncompetitive market and made it slight-
ly less competitive would be legal, though the end result of the latter would
be less desirable than that of the former. The failure of theories of section 7
illegality to encompass the instance where already undue concentration is
slightly increased is unfortunate, illogical, and inconsistent with the congres-
sional aim.8 5 In order to effect that aim--"to limit future increases in the level
of concentration" 8 -- a merger which even slightly increases already undue
concentration should be barred. Accordingly, substantiality would in some
cases be determined by the extent of the expected change in competitive
activity, and in others by the competitive situation after the merger.
The theoretical proposition that increased concentration may lessen com-
petition does not mean that a particular merger has that effect. In a market
composed of a great many small firms, a merger may occur without any
significant alteration of the competitive scene. After the merger, the remain-
ing firms will be substantially in the same situation as before; the factors that
previously spurred competition will not be appreciably changed. At the other
end of the spectrum, if three or four firms dominate an industry in which a
greater dispersion of power is both feasible and desirable, no merger of these
units should be permitted. Between these poles lies a great range of trouble-
some intermediates.
The Cases
In American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,87 a merger
of two highly competitive sugar producers was barred. Defendant, a cane
sugar producer with 8.8 per cent of the relevant ten state market, had acquired
84. See Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. 23 (Supp.
1950); Bowman, Towards Less Moiwpoly, 101 U. PA. L. Riv. 577 (1953).
85. See text following note 132 infra.
86. See note 21 supra.
87. 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958), affirming 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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stock in plaintiff, a beet sugar producer with a five per cent share of that
market. Beet and cane actively competed, and were deemed to constitute a
single market.88 Plaintiff sought to enjoin the voting and further purchase of
its stock by defendant, who was attempting to secure control of both corpora-
tions. The district court saw as its duty to consider "all the competitive
factors" in determining whether competition might be substantially lessened.89
After investigating industry structure, conduct, and performance, the court
held that common control would violate section 7, and enjoined voting and
further stock acquisition by Cuban-American. 90
The district court first noted the market shares of plaintiff and defendant,
apparently to indicate that their influence on market activity was significant.91
The remainder of the opinion emphasized the individual behavior of the firms,
both as they competed with each other, and as this activity influenced total
market competition. It portrayed them as "major competitive factors," 92 and
"of economic significance, '93 presenting in detail the arenas within which they
vigorously competed.94 The court spoke of the general competitive impact of
the rivalry between plaintiff and defendant; it noted that a "significant con-
tribution to competitive conduct is made by . . . [their] independent de-
cisions."' 9 5 Combined, they would make less of a contribution to competition
than they now make separately, and accordingly, a merger would tend sub-
stantially to lessen competition. Since entry was extremely difficult, replace-
ment of the lost competition seemed highly unlikely.96
While the test of section 7 illegality is not the amount of lost competition
between the merging units, such competition was properly given weight in
determining the effect of the contemplated merger on the market.9 7 Com-
petition does not occur in a vacuum, but affects other sellers, who must keep
pace with the competitive activities of the acquiring and acquired firms in
order to survive. Since these firms would no longer spur each other to com-
88. 259 F.2d at 529.
89. 152 F. Supp. at 395.
90. The lower court found divestiture of stock already acquired unnecessary. 152 F.
Supp. at 400-01,
91. Id. at 390-91.
92. Id. at 391.
93. Id. at 399.
94. Id. at 390-91. See discussion on market definition at notes 22-42 supra and ac-
companying text.
95. 152 F. Supp. at 399. The companies involved were subject to the restrictions of
the Sugar Act of 1943, 61 Stat. 922, as amended, 70 Stat 217 (1956), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1100-
61 (Supp. V, 1958). This legislation, however, while imposing annual production and
marketing quotas on producers, does not seriously curtail legitimate competitive efforts
to attract new purchasers-rivalry may still thrive between firms as to "who gets the
business."
96. 'See text discussion following note 82 supra.
97. -See 259 F.2d at 527, where the circuit court rejected a test of illegality based on
the acquisition's impact on competition between the corporations involved. Such a test
was abandoned in the 1950 amendment See note 21 supra.
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petitive activity, a likelihood existed that common control would engender less
competition than did independent ownership. In certain situations, however,
other firms in an industry might compete so actively that the combined unit
would have no choice but to do the same. In American Crystal Sugar, though,
the independence of decision of plaintiff and defendant was found to be a
prime factor in stimulating total market competition. The continued separation
of the two firms was correspondingly sound.98
American Crystal Sugar did not use structure analysis to strike down the
merger by demonstrating that it produced undue concentration. Rather, struc-
ture was discussed for the purpose of imputing significance to the competitive
activity of the two firms. Since the firms involved were highly competitive
major market factors, the merger was likely to diminish competition in the
industry significantly, and therefore was illegal. As a disposition of the case at
hand, this approach is satisfactory. But it fails to indicate the proper ruling
had the two firms not been vigorous competitors. In fact, it seems clear that,
given the structural importance of the two firms in a market in which two-
thirds of all sugar sold was supplied by seven firms, and in which entry was
difficult,9 9 the merger should have been barred even if they were not engaged
in active rivalry. That illegality would follow in such a case now seems estab-
lished, not by American Crystal Sugar, but by United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp.100
Bethlehem involved the proposed merger of the nation's second largest steel
producer (Bethlehem), with 15.4 per cent of the industry's ingot capacity,
and the fifth largest (Youngstown), with 4.7 per cent of this capacity.' 0 ' The
consolidated firm would have been, in terms of dollar value of facilities, the
largest industrial combination in the nation's history. 0 2 Steel is a highly con-
centrated industry; twelve integrated firms control eighty-three per cent of
the nation's capacity.10 3 Member firms had a history of growth through ex-
98. The court also spoke generally of industry concentration. 152 F. Supp. at 397. It
recognized that § 7 was in part designed to deter substantial increases in market concen-
tration, and felt that an increase in national concentration would be undesirable. Id. at 400.
Such a discussion of national market structure is puzzling in an analysis of competition in
the local ten state market area. Discussion of concentration in the relevant market would
better assist prediction as to the future competitive activity in that market. Yet, the only
mention of the ten-state market structure was the articulation of the merging firms' market
shares, and the fact that they would form the second largest seller in that market when
combined. See notes 22-42 supra and accompanying text. See 259 F.2d at 529 for the ad-
ditional information on concentration in the ten-state market provided by the circuit court,
not contained in the lower court's opinion: "one-third of its [the relevant market] supply
is scattered among others than the seven firms ... in which two-thirds of the supply is
concentrated."
99. 259 F.2d at 529-31.
100. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The defendants declined to appeal the ad-
verse decision. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1959, p. 39, col. 1.
101. 168 F. Supp. at 585. The percentages represent 1957 capacity.
102. Bethlehem-Youngstown: Controversial Engagement, Fortune, June 1957, p. 145.
'103. 168 F. Supp. at 585.
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ternal acquisition, and the industry displayed an absence of real price com-
petition. 10 4 The Government charged that the merger would substantially
lessen competition in the national iron and steel market, and in various re-
gional markets for several specified products. The court, after reviewing the
legislative history of the amended section 7, emphasized the objective of limit-
ing future increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from cor-
porate mergers and acquisitions. 1°0 It eschewed the qualitative-quantitative
dispute in determining the illegality of a merger.10 6 Instead, in the light of its
view of the purposes of the act, the court announced two standards of illegal-
ity: section 7 is violated when concentration is substantially increased, or
when a substantial competitive factor in a market is eliminated.10 7
Though the court failed to make explicit the basis for its conclusion that
Youngstown was a substantial factor, market share, both nationally and re-
gionally, appeared controlling. In concluding that concentration would be sub-
stantially increased by the merger, market structure was similarly empha-
sized.'08 The merger would have increased Bethlehem's market share from
approximately sixteen per cent to twenty-one per cent. The industry was al-
ready highly concentrated; the court spoke first of a Big Four and then of a
Big Two. The twelve integrated producers were a "severely limited group,"
uniformly adhering to the price leadership of U.S. Steel. 10 9 In this oligopolistic
industry, absorption of five per cent would, to the court, have substantially
104. Id. at 587, 606. The court recognized freight absorption as one type of com-
petition in the steel industry, but viewed this as inadequate to support claims of proper
competition. For expositions of freight absorption, see 'Stigler, A Theory of Delivered
Price Systems, 39 Am. EcoN. REv. 1.143 (1949) ; Bowman, Book Review, 17 U. Cml. L
REv. 218 (1949).
105. 168 F. Supp. at 582-83. Also emphasized were preservation of small business as
an important factor in the American economy, prevention of incipient monopolistic ten-
dencies, and avoidance of a Sherman Act test in deciding the effects of a merger.
106. Id. at 603 n.51.
107. The court listed two additional tests: where a substantial source of supply is
eliminated, or where the merger results in the establishment of relationships between
buyers and sellers which deprive their rivals of a fair opportunity to compete. Id. at 603.
Apparently, these tests were designed to deal with problems of vertical concentration.
103. See id. at 585, 586, 604, 605, 607. The acquiring unit was designated a "colossus"
and the unit to be absorbed a "giant." Id. at 604. The court emphasized the absolute size
of the merging units, not solely as it reflected the industrial strength of Bethlehem and
Youngstown, but also to illustrate the national significance of the corporations. Thus, the
merger, it is implied, would have an indirect but significant effect on the economy as a
whole. While this may well be true, it does not necessarily follow that the greater the
absolute size, the more likely it will be that a merger will prove adverse to competition.
Admittedly, when absolute size of the firms is high, the merger is likely to be illegal-
but for the reason that generally the industry will be found to be unduly concentrated.
Great absolute size may also indicate that new entry will be less likely to mitigate the
enhanced concentration. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 176, 182 n.12 (1955).
109. 168 F. Supp. at 607.
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increased concentration.110 Since replacement by a new entrant, in view of the
"frozen-entry" status of the industry, was most unlikely, this reduction in the
number of competitors would be permanent. Nor was it probable, considering
Bethlehem's past history, that the resulting firm's market share would suffer
any subsequent diminution."' Additionally, the court found the merger would
make even more difficult real competition by the small firms, who presently
follow U.S. Steel.1
12
If the substantiality of a competitor is to be determined, as in Bethlehem,
on the basis of market structure alone, the two standards enunciated in that
case seem indistinguishable. For when the factor eliminated is substantial, the
increase in concentration would also be substantial. Concomitantly, an increase
in concentration could not be substantial unless the absorbed unit has a signifi-
cant market share. On the authority of American Crystal Sugar, however,
substantiality of a competitor would also be found to exist on the basis of the
vitality with which it competes, even though its size alone is not significant. n 3
In such a case, there would not be a substantial increase in concentration, but
the merger would be illegal, because of the elimination of a substantial com-
petitor.
Bethlehem thus teaches that the absorption of a factor of substantial mar-
ket size warrants a finding of illegality, irrespective of the unit's competitive
vigor. By eliminating the firm's capacity for independent decision, and creat-
ing a unit more closely aligned with larger oligopolists, merger decreases the
unit's likelihood of ever becoming a vigorous competitor."14 Accordingly, a
substantial factor cannot justify a merger by indicating that it has refrained
from active competition, if indeed it considered such contentions good trial
strategy. Moreover, irrespective of considerations of the acquired firm's active
contribution to competition, the increase in market concentration would suffice
to warrant a finding of illegality.
On the other hand, if premerger market share is not undue, the unit's
activity becomes relevant. If a vigorous competitor is absorbed, insubstantial-
ity of increase in concentration would be irrelevant. Since the statute's ulti-
110. Id. at 604-07. Since 1905, 26% of Bethlehem's growth was due to acquisition,
58% to enlargement of acquired facilities, and 16% to enlargement of Bethlehem's original
facilities. Since 1901, 20% of Youngstown's growth was due to acquisition, 52% to en-
largement of acquired facilities, and 28% to enlargement of original facilities. Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law [hereinafter cited as Findings] Nos. 40, 43, United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., Civ. No. 115-328, S.D.N.Y., Nov. 20, 1958. But see Stigler,
The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger, 64 J. POL. ECON. 33, 38 (1.956) (percent of
growth via merger may be considerably understated when the price level of assets is much
lower during the period of most active merger).
111. 168 F. Supp. at 606.
112. Id. at 604.
113. See text at notes 7-98 supra.
114. Cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) ; American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-JAmerican Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1.957).
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mate test is lost competition, a violation might be found if the absorbed unit
were robustly competitive. If, however, the unit was a passive participant in
a competitive market, content to follow the trends of the active competitors,
the merger might be permitted. For no substantial competition is lost, and the
firm is not sufficiently significant for the loss of its potential contribution to
be of relevance. To permit a merger with an insignificant and passive com-
petitor, but not with a firm of the same size which is highly competitive,
appears to penalize the competitor, if it is not opposed to the merger as
American Crystal was. Nevertheless, competition would not be deterred by
this since the decision to compete will probably be based on profit potential-
ities, and will not be affected by the speculative desirability of qualifying under
section 7 at some future date.
A more difficult case than either American Crystal Sugar or Bethlehem
confronted the FTC in Brillo M1fg. Co." 5 Though lacking the precedent value
of either of the former cases, the facts of Brillo provide a useful context in
which to expose problems of section 7 interpretation. Brillo controlled twenty-
nine per cent of the market for industrial steel wool, and Williams, the ac-
quired corporation, eighteen per cent. The acquirer was the fourth largest of
seven producers in a market which had total annual sales of five million dollars.
In the household steel wool market, Brillo, with 45.3 per cent, was the second
largest producer. SOS, the only other major producer, controlled fifty per
cent. Williams' share of the household market was only 0.3 per cent. The
hearing examiner, basing his decision solely on what he considered a correct
application of the theory of quantitative substantiality, held that the merger
established a prima facie case of substantially lessened competition in the in-
dustrial market, but not in the consumer market. The Commission reversed
and remanded, directing the examiner to consider, in addition to market
shares, all factors, including the general competitive situation, number of com-
petitors, and the degree of concentration prevailing in the industry." 6 It also
required, in viewing the consumer market, consideration of postacquisition
production and marketing data. On remand, the examiner found no violation
in either market.
With respect to industrial steel wool, the examiner stated on remand that
concentration was not undue; though four producers controlled over eighty-
five per cent of the market, the small volume of commerce would probably
not support more than a total of seven sellers." 7 He saw the industrial steel
wool market as highly competitive in price, and entry into the market as not
difficult. Though cost savings resulting from the merger might permit Brillo
to lower its prices to the detriment of less efficient competitors, the examiner
115. TRADE REG. RE. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 11 27243 (1958) (remanding case to
examiner) ; id. ff 27641 (Nov. 26, 1958) (dismissing complaint).
116. The Commission recognized, however, that "only evidentiary material from which
significant market or competitive impact may be evident need be received." TRADE REG.
Rx'. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) f1 27243, at 36625 (1958).
117. Brillo Mfg. Co., No. 6557, FTC, Nov. 26, 1958, at 6.
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distinguished between competition and competitors, and rejected an inter-
pretation of the antitrust laws which would "insulate weak competitors from
the rigours of hard, fair competition." ' s
The examiner's statement of the propriety of premerger, and presumably
postmerger, market concentration fails to provide an adequate basis for pre-
dicting the merger's probable effects on future competition. Initially, he found
that Brillo was no more an industry leader than "any major factor in any
highly competitive market."' 19 But existence of premerger price competition
must be carefully weighed when such a significant alteration in market struc-
ture has occurred. Where structure is not markedly altered, evidence of pre-
merger competition may serve as a basis for predicting the nature of post-
merger competition. For it is reasonable to assume that when one small unit
of no special competitive significance is lost, factors which previously spurred
competitive activity will continue to do so. But the more marked the struc-
tural change caused by the merger, the less is the weight properly attributable
to premerger competitive activity. Since Brillo now controls almost half the
market, in contrast to its former share of slightly over one-quarter, the prob-
ability of leadership or other misuse of market strength subsequent to the
merger-despite premerger competition-is considerable.
Apparently to establish lack of concentration and the probable imperma-
nence of any loss of competition resulting from the merger, the examiner in-
vestigated market entry and found it not difficult. Specifically, two new en-
trants had come into the market "in recent years," one subsequent to the
merger.120 Admittedly, entry is a relevant consideration in determining not
only the competitive nature of the premerger market, but also the likelihood
of continued competition in the postmerger market'12 ' But it is unclear
whether the two new firms did enter, or could enter, on a scale approaching
that of the absorbed unit.1 22 Possibly, the entrants did not intend to-or could
not-expand to the substantial proportions of the former Williams. The entry
of one or two units which capture merely two or three per cent of a market
for an indefinite period may not support a claim that an eighteen per cent unit
will be replaced. Moreover, the one entrant subsequent to the merger does not
completely establish ease of entry, for the opinion does not consider whether
the continued existence of the newest company is to any degree assured. In
addition, the finding that entry to the industry is easy is not in harmony with
the examiner's other propositions that the industry would probably not sup-
port more than seven sellers, and that Brillo could effect cost savings by in-
creasing its market share.1 23 According to these propositions, an eighth pro-
ducer would be at a serious cost disadvantage.
118. Id. at S.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id. at 6.
121. See text at note 73 supra.
122. See text at note 84 supra.
123. No. 6557, FTC, at 6.
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Relating the number of producers to the total volume of commerce, the
examiner found the market not unduly concentrated. He viewed seven units
as a relatively large number.124 Underlying his approval of this market struc-
ture was a judgment as to the economies of scale appropriate to the indus-
try.125 But merely to state that seven producers share five million dollars
establishes nothing, for conceivably ten producers, or twenty, could profitably
have existed in the market. In fact, some of the preexisting members possessed
less than ten per cent of the market, and according to the examiner, were
going concerns. 126 Their ability to survive in the face of vigorous price com-
petition, even though they were relatively small, implies a market susceptible
to greater dispersion. 27 If the small were less efficient than the large, the lat-
ter could have underpriced the former and attained increased market shares;
if the larger corporations did not so behave, though possessed of greater effi-
ciencies, a noncompetitive situation--one not to be aggravated-would have
been evident. If the smaller firms were not in fact successful, the examiner's
contention that successful entry is easy is refuted. Furthermore, the fact that
economies of scale in the industry may have precluded more than seven pro-
ducers is irrelevant to the issue of undue concentration; it makes oligopoly
parallelism no less easy for such a small number of producers to achieve.
The propriety of concentration is not proved by numbers alone,128 but
rather may be revealed by the competitive activity in the market; healthy com-
petition suggests that concentration is not undue, and insufficient competition
suggests the opposite. Thus, the examiner's finding of price competition among
all producers deserves far greater weight than his mere articulation of the
ratio of seller number to total dollar volume. More pertinent would have been
findings whether innovations, reductions in price, or variations in distribution
techniques are initiated by the Big Four. If so, the elimination of one of the
Four, markedly increasing concentration, might seriously lessen competition.
The opinion, however, stressed the statements of government witnesses that
competition after the merger "was just as keen if not keener than before.' 129
Complete reliance cannot be placed on postmerger data. For the possibility of
Clayton Act prosecution may restrain the consolidated firm from prematurely
exercising its increased power to the probable detriment of competition. Cer-
tainly, once a suit is brought, the defendant will studiously avoid any activity
which would tend to show that competition has, or may be, lessened as a
result of the merger. But immediate forebearance to use the power to lessen
competition does not show that the merger has not created the power, nor
does it mean that it will not subsequently be exercised.
124. Ibid.
125. For a discussion of the difficulties of ascertaining economies of scale, see text at
notes 159-64 infra.
126. No. 6557, FTC, at 6.
127. For a discussion of survival as the best measure of optimum firm size, see notes
161-62 infra and accompanying text.
128. See Ar'Y GSN. REP. 325.
129. No. 6557, FTC, at 6.
1959] 1651
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Additionally, findings of premerger competition and ease of entry count for
little in the presence of substantial alteration of market structure. When a firm
attains fifty per cent control of a market, which includes only five other con-
cerns, through the absorption of a presumably vigorous eighteen per cent
competitor, those mitigants which might detract from a conclusion of illegality
lose importance.
In the duopolistic household market, the examiner's dominant consideration
was the absorbed unit's market share.130 It was apparently de minimis-'Vil-
liams did a $75,000 business in a $25,000,000 market. Under the tests enun-
ciated in Bethlehem the examiner was correct in finding no violation; add-
ing 0.3 per cent to Brillo's 45.3 per cent could not be termed a "substantial"
increase in concentration, and the absorption of Williams does not eliminate
a "substantial" competitive factor. This second conclusion is necessarily true
if the examiner's definition of the relevant geographic market as nationwide
is accepted.' 3 ' Of course, if Williams garnered its 0.3 per cent of national sales
in a "natural selling area" where it controlled perhaps twenty per cent of
regional sales, the competitive impact of the merger would be different. But
presuming that Williams had a small volume of sales in a great many areas
-although this is not apparent in the opinion-its market share was, on its
face, too inconsequential to qualify as a "substantial market factor" after the
pattern of Youngstown. Nor would Williams qualify as a "substantial market
factor" under a vigor-of-competition test borrowed from American Crystal
Sugar. Its very size indicates that it did not offer any present competition
to Brillo or SOS, the other duopolist.
Situations exist, however, when a merger should be prohibited even if the
Bethlehem standards are not violated. For example, assume that the thirty
per cent leader in the steel industry wished to merge with the eleventh largest
firm with 1.4 per cent of ingot capacity. Under Bethlehem, the increase in
concentration would not be substantial; presumably the absorption of 1.4 per
cent would not represent the loss of a "substantial factor in competition" in
the steel industry. Nevertheless. it is unlikely that Congress, in its concern
with market concentration, intended that an acquisition such as hypothesized
would be permitted. The leader of the steel industry, it would seem, should
not be allowed to increase further, even slightly, its market dominance through
merger. This is especially true since, with substantially no new firms entering,
erosion of the dominance of the large comes only from the growth of the small.
For though the change wrought in industry structure would be minimal, the
degree competition would be lessened would be substantial in relation to the
already inadequate competitive level before the merger. While such a merger
would effect neither a substantial increase in concentration nor the elimina-
130. Id. at 10 ("[T]he acquisition can have no effect upon the remaining com-
panies.").
131. See text at notes 22-42 supra.
1652 [Vol. 68 :1627
MERGERS
tion of a substantial factor in competition, it does produce an increase in un-
due concentration; and substantiality of lessened competition presumably en-
compasses aggravation of an already unfortunate situation. 1 2 Much of the
same reasoning may apply to the household facet of Brillo.
When it aimed "to limit future increases in the level of concentration,"
Congress apparently intended to prevent duopolists from increasing their mar-
ket power, no matter how slightly, by merger. It is easy to say that the elimi-
nation of the miniscule Williams cannot substantially lessen competition. Yet,
it is only the various Williamses, present and potential, who can eventually
transform the household steel wool industry's structure into one more amen-
able to active competitive. And even if Williams itself is unable ever to pro-
vide any meaningful competition for the duopolists, its continued independence
can be an invitation to potential entrants, who may be able to do so. Of course,
if increased concentration is deemed to be harmful only when the new struc-
ture is likely to cause a modification of the remaining firms' competitive activ-
ities, Williams' elimination would probably not alter industry practices, and
the merger would be properly upheld.
Summary
Oligopoly is the market structure at which section 7 is aimed. A departure
from a rationally competitive economy, oligopoly leads producers to shun com-
petitive behavior-not because of malicious intent, but because maintenance of
market share is largely dependent, in a concentrated industry, on adoption of
parallel policies. Thus, the detriment to competition flowing from a particular
merger may be measured, with relative convenience, by changes in the level of
industry concentration wrought by the consolidation. The substantiality of the
detriment will turn not only upon the market shares of the acquired and the
acquirer, but upon the level of concentration in the entire market. Easy entry
may mitigate, although to a limited extent, the effect of increased concentra-
tion. Additionally, the competitive vigor of the merging firms can be relevant
to substantiality.
Emphasis on market structure, with an eye on the merging firms' record of
active competition, would appear to combine the merits of rigid concepts of
illegality, based only upon the increase in the market share or dollar sales
volume of the acquiring firm ("quantitative substantiality"), and the analysis
of all industry factors advocated in Pillsbury. Structure analysis eases some-
what the administrative burdens of section 7 litigation-the avowed goal of
132. A result similar to that in this analysis was reached in Aluminum Co. of
America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923) (partial
acquisition by Alcoa, the nation's leading aluminum fabricator, and sole producer of vir-
gin aluminum ingot-150 million lbs. per year capacity-of an independent fabricator
with capacity to produce 3 million lbs. per year of rolled aluminum products, illegal under
§ 7).
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more arbitrary tests-without sacrificing consideration of the crucial factor of
overall industry concentration.
THE RELEVANCE OF AFFIRmATIVE BENEFITS
In the course of litigation so far conducted, defendants have claimed that
economically and socially desirable mergers are being denied.133 They have
suggested a variety of mitigating factors which, they say, should exculpate
mergers irrespective of their effect on competition. This section will undertake
to discuss the four most prominent of these factors: (1) greater efficiency of
production, (2) survival of a failing company, (3) expansion of output, and
(4) more vigorous challenge to industry leaders.
Mergers for Efficiency-Problems of Economies of Scale
Many industrial mergers, it has been contended, will permit more efficient
production, leading to lower costs and better employment of national re-
sources.134 Corporate consolidations are said to "spread overhead,"' 3 utilize
managerial talent more fully, and reach levels of efficiency that neither firm
could attain alone. While no merger, otherwise illegal, has ever been justified
133. For a comprehensive listing of the business motives for mergers see Hearings
Pursuant to S. Res. 61 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 413-14 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as 1955 Hearings] (statement of J. Fred Weston, Associate Professor of Finance,
University of California).
But "behind the publicly stated or 'good' reasons often lurks the 'real' reason."
Mead, Mergers-Good or Bad Medicine, Magazine of Wall Street, April 27, 1957, p. 146.
Among the reasons which are not likely to appear in briefs of counsel are: gains from the
sale of securities; profits of promoters; desire to eliminate a troublesome competitor or
increase market power; control of strategic patents, trade names, or trademarks; control
of key raw materials or access to important distributive outlets; realization of tax savings
through acquisition of net loss carryovers or high basis assets. 1955 Hearings 413-14;
Harris, The Urge To Merge, Fortune, Nov. 1954, p. 102; Stedman, The Merger Statute:
Sleeping Giant or Sleeping Beauty?, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 567, 594-96 (1957); Red Ink
Assets, Barron's, Dec. 8, 1958, p. 9.
The owners of closely-held corporations may desire:
to sell out for cash on a capital-gains basis, to avoid the accumulated-earnings tax,
to obviate estate-tax valuation problems and provide cash or liquid assets with
which to meet death taxes, or to exchange their closely held stock tax-fre- for
readily marketable stock of a public company.
Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes and Realism, 71 Hav. L. REv. 254, 255 (1957).
Or the manager-owner of a close corporation may merely wish to retire from active
managerial functions. See Western Meat Co. v. FTC, 1 F.2d 95, 98 (9th Cir. 1924).
1.34. E.g., Dean, Business Considerations-Why Merge?, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 513
(1958).
135. ATr'y Gpx. REP. 125. But see Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy,
104 U. PA. L. REv. 176, 181 n.10 (1955) (critical of the Committee's "overhead cost"
position).
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on these grounds, 36 efficiency arguments have received some judicial and ad-
ministrative recognition. 137
The efficiency argument derives support from the widely held view that
bigger corporations promote industrial growth. Some commentators contend
that relaxation of merger restrictions will enable management to build more
diversified and better integrated enterprises which could reach all parts of vast
domestic and foreign markets and adapt to market shifts and industrial
changes.' 38 They argue that a stronger consolidated entity could achieve
lower capital costs,13 9 support expanded technological research and develop-
136. In the case of some regulated industries, increased efficiency realized through
merger may be considered along with anticompetitive effects. E.g., McLean Trucking Co.
v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 85-87 (1944) ; Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States,
165 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D. Minn. 1958). See generally Note, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 673
(1958). The issues are different in regulated industries, however. The expertise of the
regulatory agency allows more reliable consideration of anticipated efficiencies; the regu-
lated industries are, generally, affected by declining costs, which allow firms to attain
economies of scale through consolidation, see authorities cited notes 158, 161 infra; and
supervision of ratemaking and other aspects of operation by the agency may eliminate the
need for competition as a regulator. See generally Wcox, PUBLIc POLICIES TowAnD
BUSniESS ch. 17 (1955).
137. Efficiency was discussed in a number of old § 7 cases. V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC,
54 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1931) ("The effect [of the merger] seems to have been to in-
crease the sales of the products of the . . . [merging] companies.") ; Temple Anthracite
Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656, 660 (3d Cir. 1931) ("reduction of overhead and operat-
ing expenses") ; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11. F. Supp. 117, 125 (N.D. Ohio
1935) ("reduction in costs of manufacture and distribution"). Contra, Aluminum Co. of
America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401, 408 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923);
see Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 65 F.2d 336, 337 (2d Cir. 1933), reo'd
on other grounds, 291 U.S. 587 (1934) ; Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F.2d 595, 599 (7th Cir.
1925), rev'd on other grounds, 272 U.S. 554 (1926). See also Handler, Industrial Mergers
and the Anti-trust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 179, 268 n.320 (1932) (collecting state court
cases).
The agencies have given some cognizance to the efficiency position. 1955 Hearings 298
(statement of Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General) (small automobile mergers
"might economize by eliminating duplicating facilities"). The giant 1920 mergers in which
Bethlehem acquired the second and third largest steel companies were approved by the
Attorney General (although the FTC issued complaints) on the basis of alleged econo-
mies of scale. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 5 F.T.C. 488 (1923); Historical Development and
Merger Motives of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, in U.S. TNEC MONOGR-A, p No. 13,
RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF LARGE, MEDIUM-SIzED AND SMALL BUSINESS 214, 261 (1941) ;
1 WHITNEY, ANTIrRUsT PoLICiEs-AmERIcAN EXPERIENCE IN Tw vNTY INDUsTRIES 265-66
(195S).
Some of the recent cases have implied the relevancy of efficiency contentions. American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524, 531 (2d Cir. 1958)
(dictum); cf. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1.956 Trade Cas. 71109 (E.D. Mo.);
Brillo Mfg. Co., No. 6557, FTC, Nov. 26, 1958, at 8 (cost savings resulting from greater
efficiency of the merged firm would enhance competition).
138. E.g., Slichter, A Defense of Bigness it Btsness, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1957, § 6
(Magazine), p. 10; LILIENTHAL, BIG BusINESS: A NEw ERA (1953).
139. See BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COmPETITION 146 (1956); Kaplan, Influence of
Size of Firms on the Functioning of the Econwmy, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. 74, 76-78 (Supp.
1950) ; Dean, supra note 134, at 519-20; cf. Note, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 144-45 (1959).
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ment, and better withstand the risks of introducing new products into the
market.140 Technological innovation thus promoted, the argument runs, is a
more effective market regulator than a competitive price system.141 It has also
been argued that capable executives need new outlets for their creative ener-
gies. Therefore, effective employment of top entrepreneurial ability, which is
supposedly in short supply, would require that able managers be afforded
every opportunity, including merger, to build larger economic structures. 142
Those who take the contrary view point to evidence that profit margins
are higher for medium- and small-size firms.143 They assert that no empirical
verification exists for claims that larger firms contribute proportionately more
to technological advance.1 44 Nor is there evidence, they say, that smaller firms
are more timorous in putting forth new products. Indeed, they suppose that
the small company's less secure competitive status spurs greater effort and
risk-taking; the small firm is fighting for survival, not only for profit. Market
power, they emphasize, may deaden initiative, and thus inhibit industrial prog-
ress.145 And, while recognizing that increasingly complex production processes
140. E.g., SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY chs. VII & VIII,
esp. at 84-85 (2d ed. 1947) ; GALBRAITH, AmERICAN CAPITALISM ch. VII (2d ed. 1956) ;
see MASON, ECONOMfIC CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM ch. 5 (1957) ; Stig-
ler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J.L. & EcoNoMIcs 54, 66 (1958). One author has con-
cluded from an industry study that "some degree of monopoly is essential to technological
progress . . . ." Maclaurin, Technological Progress in Some American Industries, 44
Am. EcoN. REv. 178, 182 (Supp. 1954).
141. Schumpeter, the leading advocate of this position, termed innovation a "perennial
gale of creative destruction" which forces rivals into new and better products and proc-
esses. SCHUMPETER, op. cit. supra note 140, at 84.
142. MASON, op. cit. supra note 140, at 97-99.
143. See, e.g., Rostow, Over-all Size, in How TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 311, 312-13 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954) ; U.S. TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 13, RELA-
TIVE EFFICIENCY OF LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZED, AND SMALL BUSINESS 14 (1941).
144. E.g., MASON, op. cit. supra note 140, at 99, 377-78; ADAMS & GRAY, MONOPOLY
IN AMERICA 15-16 (1955); DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN EcONOMICS AND LAW 41 (1959). In
addition some argue that large firms suppress innovations which might reduce sales. See
Adams, Technological Progress-Discussion, 44 Aas. ECON. REv. 190, 191 (Supp. 1954)
(citing, inter alia, the "heroic effort by the General Electric research organization to
shorten the life of flashlight batteries").
Recent growth of independent research corporations may enable even the smallest firms
to buy research and development in digestible doses and overcome large firm advantages.
Stedman, supra note 133, at 605. Further, the federal government is now the chief spon-
sor of technological research, either by direct subsidy or tax policy. Stocking, Institlu-
tional Factors in Econdinic Thinking, 49 Am. EcoN. REV. 1, 11 (1959). Government
could therefore influence the extent of research and development by small firms. Stedman,
supra note 133, at 605.
145. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945) ; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341, 347 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521. (1954) ; ADAMS & GRAY, MO'OPOLY IN A-mERIcA
177 (1955) ("[Tlhe rigorous discipline of the free market serves the twofold function
of compelling efficiency and preventing exploitation.").
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may dictate large plants, they doubt the necessity for cumbersome combina-
tions of geographically and functionally separate facilities.146
These commentators also stress that acquisition of competitors is but one
means of corporate expansion and diversification. 147 If the relatively easy
merger route is thrown open, they say, firms are less likely to meet the more
important challenge-and equally desirable outlet for restive managerial talent
-- of building themselves internally.148 As compared with internal growth,
mergers are, of course, a more rapid means of expansion. They obviate much
of the risk associated with starting up a new plant or division, and may re-
quire less outlay. But the lower cost of external acquisitions may reflect
nothing more than the acquirer's bargaining power, or a temporary stock
market valuation of assets below their real worth. 49 And mergers may lead
to less efficient resource utilization for the economy as a whole. The assets of
two firms may not complement each other as effectively as new assets would
complement the resources of either of them. 50 Furthermore, internal growth,
unlike mergers, necessarily increases total industry capacity. New output re-
sulting from internal growth must actively search new markets or lure cus-
tomers from competitors, thus increasing the level of competitive activity. In
addition, the more rigorous demands of internal growth may be more certain
to utilize the talents of only the most capable executives.' 5 '
Even if internal growth is impractical, corporations may expand and diver-
sify, and able managements may give full rein to their abilities, by mergers,
not violative of section 7, with firms in other markets. 15 2 In fact, such con-
146. See Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in
Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 A-A. EcoX. REv. 15, 38-39 (1954) ; Adams, The
Steel Industry, in THE STRUCTuRE OF AmERICAN INDUSTRY 145, 185-88 (Adams ed. 1954);
Douglas, Introduction to ADAmS & GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMaERICA at xiv (1955).
147. See Welling & Wirth, Diversification-With or Withwut Acquisition, in AMERI-
CAN MANAGEMENT Ass'N, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 53, 56 (1957) (six ways to diver-
sify).
148. E.g., Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Ap-
praisal, 43 VA. L. REv. 489, 494 (1957).
149. 1955 Hearings 413; Markham, supra note 148, at 494.
150. Ibid.; EDWARDS, BrG BusINEsS AND THE POLICY OF COMPETITION 123 (1956).
151. MASON, op. cit. supra note 140, at 97-99. "iS]lowly acquired internal smooth-
ness of operation" has also been cited as an advantage of internal growth over mergers.
2 DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 866 (5th ed. 1953).
152. MASON, op. cit. supra note 140, at 375.
Acquisitions in other markets may also be thwarted if "conglomerate" mergers are
successfully brought within the scope of § 7. See Procter & Gamble Co., TRADE RE. REP.
(1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ff 26737 (1957) (complaint filed against acquisition by soap pro-
ducer of largest seller of household bleaches) ; H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1949) (amended statute intended to apply to conglomerate mergers) ; Edwards, Con-
glonicrate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY
331 (1955) ; Bicks, Conglomerates and Diversification Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 175 (1956); Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics
and Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672, 683 (1958).
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glomerate mergers, providing diversification into new products and geographic
areas, may be a better hedge against seasonal fluctuations and technological
innovation than horizontal acquisitions.
If increased efficiency gained recognition as a justification for anticompeti-
tive mergers, widespread demand might be provoked for alternative and more
heavy-handed means of public control than the relatively laissez faire antitrust
laws.153 A Congress which is studying regulation of "administered prices"'15 4
in concentrated industries might not remain indifferent if the second and fifth
largest steel producers, with total capacity in excess of that of the United
Kingdom,15 5 were, in order to attain greater efficiency, allowed to unite their
three billion dollars of assets 1" under common control. Amended section 7
was itself in large part a political response to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Columbia Steel, allowing acquisition by United States Steel of a small
fabricator.157 In addition, economists advocate public regulation for industries
in which optimum efficiency is demonstrated at a very high level of output,
such as classical declining cost industries.'5 s Hence, both politically and eco-
nomically, large mergers for efficiency, if sanctioned, might present a case for
more restrictive industry controls.
Furthermore, if an efficiency defense were permitted, courts would face vast
153. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (In the absence of Sherman Act protection
against monopoly power "the demand for public regulation, public ownership, or other
drastic measures would become irresistible in times of crisis. Dispersal of private economic
power is thus one of the ways to preserve the system of private enterprise.").
154. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1959, § 4, p. 2, col. 6 (Senate subcommittee considering
proposals for FTC hearings before price increases in concentrated industries) ; Hearings
Pursuant to S. Res. 231 and S. Res. 57 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monwpoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 9 & 10
(1959). Dale, Debate on. "Administered Prices," N.Y. Times, March 22, 1959, § 4, p. 7,
col. 3; Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, A Study of Administered Prices
in the Steel Industry, S. REP. No. 1387, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). But see Adminis-
tered Price?-A Hard Look at Competition in the Steel Industry, Barron's, Oct. 20, 1958,
p. 5.
155. Compare Findings No. 62 (Youngstown and Bethlehem had a combined capacity,
as of January 1, 1958, of 29.5 million tons), with N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1959, p. 35, col. 3
(estimated steel-making capacity of the United Kingdom as of January 1, 1959, was 26.2
million tons; of West Germany, 31.5 million tons).
156. Findings No. 60; see The 300 Largest Maufacturers it 1957, 16 CoNF. BD.
Bus. REc. 181, 182-83 (1959) (Bethlehem the 1lth largest and Youngstown 52d in terms
of total assets).
157. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). The importance of
this decision in bringing forth the 1950 amendment is discussed in note 20 sqpra and
accompanying text.
158. Edwards, Public Policy in. a Free Enterprise Economy, in THE STRUCrURE OF
A ME cAx INDUsTRY 508, 534 (Adams ed. 1950); WiLcox, PUBLIC POLIcrES TowARD
BusiNEss 498 (1955) ; Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L.
Rzv. 176, 182 (1955) ("if the economies of scale are substantial, then competition cannot
be used to regulate the industry").
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difficulties in determining which acquisitions deserved legal approval.'59 Quite
clearly, all mergers do not promote efficiency, and reliable criteria for separat-
ing the economic from the uneconomic would be required. Whether the assets
of two corporations will function more efficiently combined than separate de-
pends upon alleged economies of multiplant operations (which must be dis-
tinguished from economies associated with larger single plants). Neither
economists nor businessmen have been able to devise tests for assessing the
economic impact of particular multiplant consolidations; studies of the general
level of efficiency in some industries with multiplant firms have just begun.'60
One measure of multiplant economies of scale which has 'been suggested is
the "survivor test" :161 those firms which survive and increase their market
share are presumed efficient, while those which fail or lose in market share
are deemed less efficient. Hence, according to this view, when a firm, in a
size range in which survival and increase in market share had been demon-
strably less prevalent, merges, the consolidation will result in economies of
scale. This survivor test is said to be the only measure of a firm's ability to
cope with all the problems of doing business: buying resources, dealing with
labor, finding customers, introducing new products, coping with fluctuations.
Any test based upon cost factors alone, advocates of the survivor test con-
tend, would fail to account for many of the realities of corporate life.
1 2
On the basis of the few survivor-test studies which have been made, it may
be concluded that the range of efficient firm size is very -broad in most indus-
tries 163-for example, all steel producers with more than 2.5 per cent but less
159. See Coox, EmicTs OF MERGERS 433 (1958). After analyzing the role of mergers
in six major manufacturing industries in the United Kingdom, Cook concluded that econ-
omies of scale and efficiency played a different role in each.
160. See BAIN, BARumus To Nzw ComPrnnoN 83 (1956); Stigler, The Econoies
of Scale, 1 J.L. & EcoNomics 54 (1958) ("[AIll economists have been ignorant of the
optimum size of firm in almost every industry all of the time.") ; MAsoNr, op. cit. supra
note 140, at 355; Smith, Survey of the Empirical Evidence on Economies of Scale, in
BusINEss CONCENTRATION AND PRIcE PoLIcY 213, 230 (1955).
161. See Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Am. EcoN. REV. 23, 26
(Supp. 1950) ; Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. Rzv. 577, 587-89 (1953);
Stigler, supra note 160, at 64.
162. See authorities cited note 161 supra.
But others, while suggesting no alternative, say that the survivor test is imprecise and
measures too much. Survival, they point out, reflects not only economic efficiency, but
also monopoly bargaining power, political influence, and every other noneconomic factor
which might improve profit margins. In addition, market imperfections, which allow firms
to withstand significant disadvantages of small scale and survive on the "starvation mar-
gin," may distort survivor-test data. Further, the survivor test applied on an industrywide
basis may improperly include firms which produce varying product lines, or a smaller
range of products. Finally, it is argued, when absolute output has increased or remained
stable, long run decline in the market share of large firms fails to prove that there are
diseconomies of scale. See Bain, Capitalism and Monopolistic Competition--Discussion,
40 Air. EcoN. REv. 63, 65 (Supp. 1950); MASON, op. cit. supra note 140, at 355-57;
WESTON, THE ROLE OF MERGERS IN THE GROWTH OF LARGE FiRms 62-66 (1953).
163. 'Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J.L. & EcoNOMIcS 54, 71 (1958) ("Perhaps
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than twenty-five per cent of industry capacity fall within the efficient size
range.0 4 This conclusion accords with that of critics of the survivor test,10
and indicates that a merger-for-efficiency defense would have limited applica-
tion. Since one of two merging firms would seldom fall below the wide range
of efficient size, merger would rarely spell cost savings or greater production.
In practice, therefore, an efficiency defense could rarely be established.
If one of the merging firms is so inefficient that it is unable to survive, the
merger would escape illegality under the "failing company" doctrine, which
will be discussed in the succeeding section.' 66 Furthermore, in the few non-
failing-company cases where merger and efficiency might be established as
inextricably related, consolidations would ordinarily not violate the statute.
Firms that fall below efficient levels of output are likely to be the smallest in
the industry, with insignificant or declining market shares. For example, when
six automobile producers,'16 7 with Antitrust Division approval, partly based
on efficiency, merged to form Studebaker-Packard, American Motors, and
Kaiser-Willys, none had more than 1.5 per cent of the market.108 Since the
Big Three were selling ninety-five per cent of all automobiles, 1 9 it is doubt-
ful that a court would have found that the consolidations substantially lessened
competition or tended to create monopolies. Similarly, in none of the old sec-
tion 7 cases in which courts imputed importance to economies of scale did
efficiency appear relevant to the decision; none of the mergers, it seems, would
have created an illegal degree of market power.'"
By equating market power with social and economic benefit, and claiming
that deterioration of competition can be justified by advances in efficiency, the
merger-for-efficiency contention runs counter to the basic tenets of antitrust
the most striking finding of our exploratory studies is that there is customarily a fairly
wide range of optimum sizes . . ").
164. Id. at 58; see Adams, The Steel Industry, in THE STRUcTURE OF AMIERICAN
INDUSTRY 148, 189 (rev. ed. Adams 1955) ; Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 577, 600 (1953); BAIN, BARRIERS To NEW CompEITION 86 (1956).
165. Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty
Manufacturing Industries, 44 Am. EcoN. REv. 15, 39 (1954) ("such economies generally
are unimportant after all") ; BAIN, op. cit. supra note 164, at 89, 112-13, 211.
166. Text at notes 178-212 infra.
167. See Stigler, supra note 163, at 61 (economies of scale in automobile industry
require large market share) ; CooK, Ercrs OF MERGERS 431 (1958) (same in United
Kingdom) ; BAIN, op. cit. supra note 164, at 81.
168. 1955 Hearings 298 (statement of Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral) ; id. at 443 (statement of George Romney, President of American Motors Corp.);
id. at 853 (statement of James J. Nance, President of Studebaker-Packard Corp.).
169. Id. at 298.
170. Note 137 supra and accompanying text; see V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54 F.2d
273, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1931) (two small cosmetics producers whose products were found
to be noncompetitive) ; Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656, 660 (3d Cir.
1931) (two depression-hit coal producers with an inconsequential market share). The
only possible exception is United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 118-19
(N.D. Ohio 1935) (producer with 7.2% of steel capacity and producer with 1.5% during
mid-depression when operations below 40% of capacity).
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legislation. The policies embodied in the Sherman and Clayton Acts go beyond
considerations of economic efficiency." t7 They manifest a congressional desire
to restrain inordinate private power over the level of output, employment, and
prices in significant sectors of the national economy. They reflect antipathy
toward what Judge Learned Hand has called the "indirect social or moral
effect" of a system in which "the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of a few.' 72 The congressional attack upon excess market power
should be viewed as a mandate to risk inefficiency, if necessary, to avoid ex-
cessive agglomerations of private power.173
Therefore, courts have refused to pay heed to claims of economic benefits
in cases involving the Sherman Act offenses of monopolization and restraint
of trade.' 74 Clayton Act prohibitions of incipient monopoly and oligopoly
power require the same interpretation. 7 5 True, it has been suggested that
monopoly "thrust upon" a Sherman Act defendant by greater efficiency might
not constitute an actionable violation.'17 But, apart from the "failing company"
situation, consolidation could not be said to be forced upon the merging firms.
If both have survived in the market, that is the best measure available of their
ability to exist as efficient, independent units. This history of survival renders
arguments of efficiency even less significant in section 7 cases than in Sher-
man Act litigation. Under the latter statute, courts are called upon to break
up going economic enterprises. The anticipated efficiency of the smaller units
resulting from dissolution is more speculative, and the economic cost of a mis-
171. For a discussion of the policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, attacking mar-
ket power without reference to efficiencies, see authorities cited notes 2-6 supra and ac-
companying text.
172. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945),
quoted in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
173. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 172, at 429 ("Through-
out the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes
was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake, and in spite of possible cost, an organi-
zation of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other."). But
cf. GALBRAITH, AIIERICAN CAPITALISm-THE THEORY OF COUNTERVAILING POWER ch.
IX (2d ed. 1956) (absence of traditional intraindustry competition must be accepted; but
excess corporate power is held in check by big labor and big government). Contra,
ADAMS & GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AIERICA Vii (1955) ("government often supports, rather
than countervails, the forces making for concentration").
174. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813 (1946) ; United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347
U.S. 521 (1954); Ar'y GEN. REP. 52; ADAms & GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERIcA vi
(1955).
175. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (1958),;
Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401, 408 (3d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 261
U.S. 616 (1923).
176. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945).
The Attorney General's Committee has advocated the "thrust upon" suggestion as a com-
plete defense. ATr'Y GEN. REP. 56-60.
19591
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
take in judgment by the court is greater, than when the issue is whether two
profitable businesses will be more efficient if they combine.
In addition, if bigness, and therefore large investment, is necessary for
efficiency, entry of new firms to the industry will be more difficult. Increases
in market share and withdrawal of competitors will thus work lasting injury
to competition. And, if courts were called upon to balance efficiency against
market power, they would be dealing with phenomena which could not use-
fully be compared. Findings that efficiency would be increased eleven per cent
and market power ten per cent, even if such findings are possible, would not
conclude the issue in favor of merger. A court might well believe that a fifteen
per cent, or fifty per cent, increase in efficiency was needed to justify a ten
per cent increment in market power. But nowhere in economic literature or
legal precedent would courts find ways to balance market power with effi-
ciency. Nor would the presumed expertise of the FTC seem adequate to make
such determinations. 1 7
Mergers for Survival-Problems of the Failing Company
Instances may arise when consolidation is a firm's only means of survival.
Hence, in the old section 7 case of International Shoe,'18 the Supreme Court
allowed a merger, which the FTC had concluded would violate the statute, 70
because the acquired corporation's "resources [were] so depleted and the
prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a
business failure."' 80 The Court conditioned its approval of the merger with
the largest firm in the industry on the unavailability of an alternative pur-
chaser.181 This doctrine has been consistently followed in the litigated cases, 18 -2
and has been applied by the enforcement agencies in their merger clearance
procedures. 83 In addition, it was recognized in the legislative history of new
177. 'See Goox, EFrrcr oF MEaGas 442 (1958) ("Only in a small number of more
simple cases ... is it possible to reach any definite judgment as to whether or not a
merger is in the public interest.").
178. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) (alternative holding).
179. International Shoe Co., 9 F.TC. 441 (1.925). The Court of Appeals had agreed
with the Commission. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 518 (1st Cir. 1928).
180. 280 U.S. at 302.
The acquired corporation had a $4 million deficit at the time of merger, owed $15
million to banks, and owed $2 million on current account. Id. at 300.
181. Id. at 302-03.
182. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808
(D.D.C. 1958), appeal docketed, 27 U.S.L. W=- 3351 (U.S. May 22, 1959) (1958 Term,
No. 942) ; In re Pressed Steel Car Co., 16 F. Supp. 329, 338-39 (W.D. Pa. 1936) (com-
pany already in bankruptcy); see Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 880-81 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944) (dictum). For an earlier case see Aluminum Co.
of America v. FTC, 299 Fed. 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1924). See also American Press Ass'n
v. United States, 245 Fed. 91, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1917) (Sherman Act does not prohibit
failing company merger).
183. Barnes, Mergers, in 1955 ANTIRUST LAW SYmPosIUm 49 (CCH 1955); 1955
Hearings 326-27 ('Statement of Stanley N. Barnes) ; 1 TRADE REG. REP. 11 4207.105 (letter
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section 7.184 Often regarded as a well-defined rule, the International Shoe
doctrine, on close analysis, presents vexing problems of interpretation and
administration.1 85
Because it avoids misallocation of resources, International Shoe is econom-
ically justified. The fact that a company is unable to survive is the best in-
dication that its assets are not being employed most efficiently.'8 6 While
multiplant economies in non-failing-company consolidations are probably too
speculative to permit an otherwise illegal merger,'8 7 the inability of a firm to
survive is sufficient basis for an inference that merger will increase efficiency
substantially.
Conceptually, a failing-company merger, in the absence of an alternative
purchaser, may not constitute a substantial lessening of competition under
section 7.181 Prohibition of the merger would result in withdrawal of the fail-
ing company's assets from the market, and the stimulus to competition pro-
vided by the failing company would be lost. Except in rapidly declining in-
dustries, where large firms have suffered continuing financial reverses, the
contribution to competition afforded by a failing company will rarely be sig-
nificant.' 89 True, the acquiring firm will increase its market share through the
sales of the revived failing company. But even if the consolidation is banned,
the acquiring corporation would increase its market share to the extent that
it began supplying the customers of its insolvent competitor. For example,
suppose seller A with eighty-five per cent of the market acquired failing seller
B with five per cent, and remaining seller C possesses ten per cent. 90 If A
from Victor R. Hansen, Assistant Attorney General, to Frank Bartholomew, President,
United Press International, May 29, 1958, approving merger of United Press and Inter-
national News Service under the International Shoe doctrine).
184. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949) ; Ar'Ty GEN. REP. 123.
185. For brief discussions of the doctrine see Handler, Industrial Mergers and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 32 CoLum. L. REv. 179, 269 (1932). Note 45 VA. L. REV. 421 (1959);
Comment, 46 ILL. L. Ray. 444, 460-62 (1951).
186. For a discussion of the "survivor test" as the best measure of efficiency, see
notes 161-62 supra and accompanying text.
187. See text at notes 159-65 supra.
188. 280 U.S. at 302-03 (a failing company merger "does not substantially lessen
competition . . . within the intent of the Clayton Act"); United States v. Maryland &
Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958), appeal docketed, 27
U.S.L. WEaa 3351 (U.S. May 22, 1959) (1958 Term, No. 942) (a failing company
merger "cannot result in lessening competition") ; Address by Bethuel M. Webster, The
Clayton Act Today: Merging and Marketing, New York State Bar Association Section
on Antitrust Law, llth Annual Meeting, January 29, 1959, P. 9 ("[W]hen an acquired
company meets the Intertational Slwe test, a statutory exception is not necessary, since
competition can not be lessened by the elimination of an enterprise that was unable to
compete.").
189. In most industries only firms with insignificant and declining market shares will
suffer diseconomies of scale. See notes 163-70 supra and accompanying text.
190. These facts approach those in United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers
Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D.D.C. 1958), appeal docketed, 27 U.S.L. W=uK 3351
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were better situated than C to supply B's customers-because A has excess
capacity, or A can more readily expand, or A's plant is better located-A
would achieve a ninety per cent market share, or at least more than eighty-
five per cent, even if the merger were forbidden and B failed. Of course,
merger would hand B's customers to A without potential competitive struggle
for them with C. But such struggle presumably would not have a far-ranging
impact; most likely, A and C would merely continue their normal sales efforts,
particularly if the product is one offered to the general public.
If the increased concentration resulting from a failing-company merger does
constitute a substantial lessening of competition, 191 justification can be found
in the legislative history of section 7. While the statutory language makes no
allowance for subordinating antitrust objectives to considerations of resource
allocation, International Shoe was approved in the congressional reports which
led to the 1950 amendment.192 The doctrine could thus be deemed a legisla-
tively approved judicial exception to the statute, codification of which Con-
gress regarded unnecessary, probably because it felt failing-company mergers
could not work substantial injury to competition.
Before applying International Shoe, courts should determine whether the
acquired firm is unable to survive as an independent enterprise. If the com-
pany will survive in the absence of merger, the doctrine would seem inappro-
priate; only the probability of discontinued operations would render the ac-
quirer's increased market power unimportant. Ability to survive is essentially
a question of fact :lg3 in the absence of merger, would the company involun-
tarily leave the market? Financial insolvency, neither in the "equity" sense
(inability to pay debts as they become due), nor in the "bankruptcy" sense
(excess of liabilities over assets), 9 should not be conclusive of inability to
survive.195 Maturities might be met or debt redressed by obtaining funds on
the capital market, or by financial reorganization not involving partial or total
liquidation of assets.19 6 In resolving this fact issue, courts may find some guid-
ance in the causes of the company's decline. For example, reverses which are
(U.S. May 22, 1959) (1958 Term, No. 942), but B's market share is somewhat obscure
in the opinion. The Government's litigation was primarily directed at A's acquisition of
C, which is not here relevant.
191. See Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 421, 427 (1959).
192. See note 184 supra and accompanying text.
193. Once determined, the fact would be subject to appellate review in accordance
with FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
353 U.S. 586, 599 n.28 (1957) ("findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous"). And FTC findings, "if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclu-
sive.' 38 Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1952); FTC v. International
Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1956) ("The Clayton Act clearly recognizes that
a court of appeals has no fact finding powers. .... ").
194. See COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 1.09 (2d ed. Edelman 1954).
195. For a discussion of the inconclusive history of the meaning of "failure," see
Note, 45 VA. L. Rzv. 421, 423-24 (1959).
196. The opinion of the majority in InternationaI Shoe seems to accept the view of
the lower court, International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 518, 522 (1st Cir. 1928), that
if new bank credit, receivership, or financial reorganization were viable possibilities the
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linked to a cyclical market swing, rather than a secular decline in the firm's
fortunes, are less likely to manifest inefficiencies which impair survival. 197
In determining inability to survive, a trier of facts is faced with the difficult
task of evaluating management's opinion that consolidation is the only route
to continued market participation.10  An interval between consummation of
the merger and section 7 litigation may obscure the facts and provide oppor-
tunities for subterfuge. For example, the acquirer could "milk" the acquiree's
facilities in anticipation of suit. Because of such possibilities for abuse, and
because financial data are more readily available to them,19 9 defendants should
have the burden of proving that survival is not possible in the absence of
merger. 200
merger should be disallowed. 280 U.S. at 302. See Crown Zellerbach Corp., TRADE REG.
REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ff 26923, at 36461 (1957) (failing company doctrine not ap-
plicable to acquisition which it was alleged would enable continuation of a moderniza-
tion program of a highly solvent company).
197. The dissenters in International Shoe were of the opinion that the acquired com-
pany's misfortunes resulted from a temporary 1920-1921 recession in the shoe market.
280 U.S. at 306. In Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401. (3d Cir. 1922),
cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923), an independent aluminum fabricator was caught in a
government-imposed price squeeze. Under World War I ceilings, the price of ingot, sup-
plied only by Alcoa, was fixed at 324 per lb., while the price for rolled sheet, produced
by the fabricator, was set at only 40¢. The fact that the fabricator's operations were thus
temporarily unprofitable was held not to justify a merger with Alcoa. 284 Fed. at 408.
For subsequent history of the case, see Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 299 Fed. 361
(3d Cir. 1924); 2 WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIEs-A'ERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY
INDUSTRIES 88 (1958) (mill closed as obsolete).
198. See Barnes, Mergers, in 1955 ANTIRUST LAW SymPosium 49, 50-52 (CCH
1955). In Crown Zellerbach Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) I 26923, at
36641 (1957), the FTC refused to accept management's judgment that the modernization
program of the acquired firm could not have been completed in the absence of merger,
and the Commission rejected defendants International Shoe contention.
The history of International Shoe itself exemplifies the difficulty of second-guessing
management. The FTC, International Shoe Co., 9 F.T.C. 441. (1925), the lower court,
29 F.2d at 522, and the dissenters (Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis, JJ.), 280 U.S. at 306,
thought that the company could have been rehabilitated, but the majority gave manage-
ment's judgment that merger was necessary for survival a "presumption of rightfulness,"
280 U.S. at 302.
199. The Federal Trade Commission has power to demand corporate documents. 38
Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1952). But FTC investigators may be unable to sub-
poena information most pertinent to the inquiry unless they are given access to company
files to determine what material is available. Counsel generally refuse such access. Decker,
Antitrust Investigations From the B,siness Lawyer's Viewpoint, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 111,
114, 116 (1956). The Antitrust Division may obtain compulsory process only by the
cumbersome procedure of convening a grand jury. Id. at 114-15. A pending bill, which
has received subcommittee approval in the Senate, would give the Antitrust Division
power to secure corporate records without subpoena. Wall Street Journal, May 4, 1959,
p. 4, col. 2.
200. See 1955 Hearings 326 (Statement of Stanley N. Barnes) (defendants must
"show first that they are what can be considered a failing corporation."). Nor would it
seem proper to create a presumption in favor of management's judgment as did the ma-
jority in International Shoe. 280 U.S. at 302.
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The failing company may be an insolvent division or subsidiary of an other-
wise successful firm. In such a case, if competition would be substantially
lessened in markets other than those in which the division or subsidiary
operates, International Shoe should not be available to justify a merger in-
volving the entire company. 201 Further, since rehabilitation under present
ownership is often feasible, separate sale of an insolvent division or subsidiary
to a competitor deserves critical review. Thus, the sale by Curtis Publishing
Company of its consistently unprofitable farm magazine to the publisher of
the leading rural periodical was held illegal. According to the FTC, Curtis
could have "revitalized" the publication, which would not have been discon-
tinued in the absence of merger.202
The most difficult International Shoe problems arise when an alternative
purchaser is or might 'be available.20 3 The inability of a firm to survive may
be cured by merger with various firms. Section 7 problems will occur, of
course, only when the failing company seeks to merge with a competitor, and
will be most acute when the would-be acquirer possesses a considerable mar-
ket share. Such a competitor will often offer the highest price for the assets,
in anticipation of increased profits as a result of greater market control. Con-
summation of the failing-company merger may therefore foreclose purchase
by other firms.
If an alternative purchaser with substantially less market power, capable of
employing the failing company's assets with reasonably comparable efficiency,
is thus foreclosed, the merger could contravene section 7. Assuming that the
alternative purchaser is ready and willing to buy, "'but for" the merger a more
competitive market situation would obtain, and, therefore, the merger lessens
competition.20 4 The substantiality of this lessening would normally be deter-
mined by the change in industry concentration caused by the merger. The
degree of market concentration existent after the merger is another possible
test.205
The greater the disparity in market power between the acquirer and the
alternative purchaser, the more injury to competition could be curtailed by
prohibiting the merger. The most desirable alternative purchaser would be one
not already in the same market, who could stimulate competition in the in-
dustry through independent decisions.
201. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 594-95
n.13 (1957) (". . . if the forbidden effect or tendency is produced in one out of all the
various lines of commerce, the words 'in any line of commerce' literally are satisfied.");
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
202. Farm Journal, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) 1 26023; id.
26127 (1956).
203. The alternative purchaser requirement is well-embedded in the doctrine. See
1955 Hearings 326; Barnes, Mergers, in 1955 ANTITRUST LAW Symposium 49, 50 (CCH
1955) ; Arr'y GEN. REP. 123. But see Note 45 VA. L. REv. 421, 427 (1959) (questioning the
relevance of the requirement).
204. The "but for" test of illegality is set forth in text preceding note 84 supra.
205. See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
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To obviate competitive injury resulting from foreclosure of an alternative
purchaser, the courts and enforcement agencies should, following this analysis,
require that opportunity exists for public bidding. Since the high price offered
by a dominant competitor may be designed to outbid industry rivals in order
to reap higher profits from increased industry control, alternative buyers
should be allowed to come forward with lower bids. Hence, the Antitrust
Division procedure in approving the recent acquisition by the New Orleans
Times-Picayune of its only competitor in the city's daily newspaper market 20 6
appears unwise. The Division required that other potential buyers match the
Times-Picacyune offer 207 which, since it led to unitary control of New Orleans
newspapers, may have been inflated by anticipated monopoly profits.
If the firms seek approval of the Antitrust Division or the FTC through
their merger clearance procedures, as did Times-Picayune, the enforcement
agency can withhold consent, or, if necessary, the Antitrust Division can seek
injunction, unless the parties publicly and fairly request alternative bids.208
But, if firms know that the enforcement agencies will pursue such a policy,
they are unlikely voluntarily to seek clearance and submit themselves to the
requirement of public bidding and the possibility of injunction. Adoption of
the pending legislation requiring sixty-day notice of all significant mergers,
and giving the FTC merger injunction power,20 9 would therefore seem essen-
tial to guarantee public bidding. If this legislation is not enacted, firms may
acquire failing companies before there has been an opportunity for alternative
purchasers to make offers; indeed, the merger may reach court a fait accompli
after many months have elapsed.2 10 When the operations of the failing com-
pany have thus become integrated with those of the acquiring firm, other
buyers may no longer be forthcoming; and, in any event, subsequent divesti-
ture and sale is vastly more difficult and less desirable.2 1 1
206. Antitrust Newsletter, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 594 (1958).
207. Ibid. Also, the buyer would be required to pay Times-Picayune $75,000 for
expenses.
208. The Federal Trade Commission cannot now seek merger injunction. FTC v. In-
ternational Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956).
209. The pending bill, which has received subcommittee approval in the Senate, would
require 60-day notice when the combined assets of the merging firms exceed $10 million.
Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1959, p. 4, col. 2. A text of the Administration bill originally
proposed in 1956 appears in 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 669 (1956). See Hansen, Current Prob-
lems and Policies of the Antitrust Division, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 437, 441 (1957) ; Riehm
& Billyou, A Comment oon the Proposed Notice Legislation, 2 ANTITRUST BULL 195
(1957).
210. Illegality may be found for mergers which occurred as much as 30 years ago.
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). See also Kroger
Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 27885 (FTC April 1, 1.959) (complaint challenging acquisition
made 31 years ago) ; Scott Paper Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 1127716
(Jan. 5, 1959) (merger which occurred in 1951 still in the process of litigation).
211. See Comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 444, 461-62 (1951.); Farm Journal, Inc., TRADE
REG. REP. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) ff 26127 (1956).
Short of injunction, a court may order the acquiring firm to maintain separate finan-
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If public bidding discloses one or more alternative purchasers, the courts
and agencies should determine whether to bar the proposed merger and, by
so doing, force the owners of the failing company to sell to another-and in-
variably lower-bidder. This determination will of necessity be most complex
and speculative. It will turn, first, upon whether the alternative use will be a
reasonably economic employment of the failing company's assets. Thus a court
may conclude that the conversion of a broiler factory to toasters would be a
tenable alternative to acquisition by a dominant broiler maker, but that con-
version of the plant to a warehouse, and sale of the equipment as junk, would
misallocate resources. But this problem of asset employment in presumably
separate lines of commerce would rarely arise. Since the dominant firm's will-
ingness to continue a failing plant in its present capacity would point to the
plant's continued utility in the same industry, other bids would normally be
forthcoming from the dominant firm's rivals. Second, the court or agency
would have to determine if market concentration resulting from the merger
would be substantially greater than that resulting from the alternative pur-
chase. The effect upon market concentration of the merger, as compared with
the alternative purchase, may be estimated by employing the usual criteria of
illegal market power under section 7.
If it is determined that acquisition by a lower bidder would result in sub-
stantially less market concentration, the statute would seem to call for a pre-
sumption in its favor. That the dominant firm might employ the failing com-
pany's assets more efficiently than others in the industry would not alter this
presumption. The problem of which firm will achieve the greatest efficiency
is often insoluble, and efficiency cannot profitably be balanced against in-
creased market power.2 12 Finally, the International Shoe doctrine looks only
to survival in the industry, not to maximization of efficiency. So long as the
acquirer can put the failing company's assets to sound uses, it would seem
irrelevant that an acquisition, which would more adversely affect competition,
would also result in the utmost efficiency.
Mergers for Expansion-Problems of Increasing Productive Capacity
The principal attempt to justify the merger prohibited by United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp.213 was the argument that consolidation would enable
defendants to develop facilities in the Chicago area for the production of heavy
structural steel,21 4 which was allegedly in "deficit" supply in the midconti-
nent.2 1 5 This expansion, it was contended, could not feasibly be accomplished
cial data to minimize difficulties of a subsequent divestiture order. United States v. Brown
Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 71109 (E.D. Mo.).
See also note 4 supra.
212. See text at notes 159-65, 177 supra.
213. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
214. Brief for Defendants, June 23, 1958, pp. 19-21; 168 F. Supp. at 616.
215. Brief for Defendants, June 23, 1958, p. 5 (heavy structural shapes and plates have
been in "critical short supply for many years") ; id. at 15-16 (the midcontinent and
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without the merger.2 16 Thus, the merger-for-expansion rationale is but a more
specific extension of the merger-for-efficiency argument. 217 While expansion
of output is often of crucial importance, total merger of competing firms is
not the only or best way to achieve needed economic growth. The court's con-
clusion in Bethlehem, that expansion projects fall outside the ambit of judicial
inquiry in section 7 cases, appears correct.218
Higher capital costs are said to be the principal barrier to independent im-
plementation of a proposed expansion by either merging firm.210 Arguably,
economies of scale and the greater size and stability of the combined firm will
make the necessary funds available on more favorable terms. Multiplant
economies of scale are normally too doubtful, however, to be determinative of
whether a consolidated company will better absorb capital costs. 22° Further,
alleged reductions in capital costs may in part reflect anticipated higher profits
deriving from enhanced market power-not efficiency-of the merged firm,
and thus may divert investment from smaller, perhaps more efficient, indus-
tries to oligopolies.22t This result seems too contrary to the thrust of section
7 to provide the basis for a justification of the statute's contravention. Inso-
far as greater diversity and stability, rather than economies of scale, render
capital cheaper, a conglomerate merger, which does not substantially lessen
competition, could have the same result. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that
a horizontal merger will be essential to obtain capital for expansion. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the merger-for-expansion argument
will be forthcoming only when new facilities appear economically essential.
And, the more urgently new capacity is needed, the more readily funds will
be available without anticompetitive merger. If the new output would meet
Chicago areas will experience "the greatest future growth in consumption of finished
steel product.") ; Findings No. 398.
216. Brief for Defendants, June 23, 1958, p. 22 (Chicago expansion "would be an
imprudent expenditure of ... [Bethlehem's] available funds") ; id. at 26-27 (Youngstown
could not generate funds, issue securities, or obtain outside financing).
217. See text at notes 134-77 supra.
218. 168 F. Supp. at 617.
219. See authorities cited note 139 supra. For a discussion of capital requirements as
a barrier to entry to new markets, see BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COmPETITIO 166 (1956).
Bethlehem fortified its position with the argument that construction costs, in addition to
capital costs, could be lowered by the acquisition. Youngstown's facilities could be ex-
panded at a cost of $358 million or $135 per ingot ton. Estimated cost of a new integrated
facility-which Bethlehem claimed was the only viable alternative-was $750 million or
$300 per ingot ton. Brief for Defendants, June 23, 1958, p. 22. For Youngstown, of course,
construction costs would be roughly the same, with or without merger. The Government
questioned whether Bethlehem could not, in the absence of merger, build a Chicago plant
with a limited range of products-primarily heavy structurals-at considerably lower
cost than a complete integrated facility. Plaintiff's Brief After Trial, p. 88.
220. See Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. 23, 27
(Supp. 1950).
221. See DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN EcoNomICS AND LAW 33 (1959).
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assured demand-would cater to a "deficit area" for example--capital should
be plentiful on reasonable terms. 222
It has also been argued that only merger will make essential personnel
available to expanding firms. 22 3 If acquisition of personnel by one firm is the
reason for the merger, personnel costs will be reflected in the merger's terms.
Funds, which would otherwise be consumed in the exchange of shares or the
price paid for the consolidation, might therefore be utilized for training pro-
grams or more attractive salaries, which would enhance the firm's fund of
managerial or technological talent. A firm should have little difficulty in at-
tracting qualified personnel at salaries it can afford if the expansion will cater
to an assured market-if it is a truly essential expansion. In some cases, the
high cost of personnel may indicate that the needed ability is scarce. If so, the
market will be one in which entry is highly difficult, and the anticompetitive
effect of the merger will be correspondingly increased.2 24
If expansion projects were heard to rebut a violation of section 7, adminis-
trative problems would be close to insurmountable. First, courts (or the FTC)
would be forced to second-guess management's judgment that merger is a pre-
requisite to expansion. Information essential to this determination-interest
rates, costs of construction, expected return on investment, abilities of man-
agement, cost of obtaining or training personnel, economies of scale-is
uniquely available to the merging firms, 225 who are "interested" parties. 2 0
Further, if it were found that merger was essential to expansion, a court (ex-
222. See HANSEN, TEE A mIcAN ECONOmY 34-37 (1957) (funds for expansion of
facilities have been readily available).
If capital barriers do in fact deter needed expansions, Congress could lower them by
allowing rapid amortization of new facilities for tax purposes. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 168 (5-year amortization of emergency defense facilities) ; Findings No. 396 (U.S. Steel
received rapid amortization with respect to $468 million of the approximately $600 million
cost of its Fairless Works, constructed during the Korean conflict).
223. 168 F. Supp. at 616 ("Youngstown claims it is without the know-how, the ex-
perienced personnel . . . to enter into the structural shape and plate business.").
224. See Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal,
43 VA. L. Rlv. 489, 494-95 (1.957).
225. See note 199 supra for a discussion of the problem of obtaining information.
226. Bethlehem illustrates the problem of evaluating management contentions. Despite
contrary expression of its capabilities and intentions, it now appears that Bethlehem will
build in the Chicago area. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1959, p. 39, col. 1 (statement by A. B.
Homer, President of Bethlehem, that the company has "already proceeded" to study
building on its 4,000 acres of Chicago property) ; Bethlehem-Youngstown: Controversial
Engagement, Fortune, June 1957, pp. 145, 188 (Bethlehem reportedly would have built
on its Chicago area tract whether the merger was blocked or not).
Although defendants estimated that a new integrated facility with 2.5 million tons of
ingot capacity would cost $300 per ton, little Barium Steel Corporation (less than $20
million current net assets, 1959 MooDY's INDUSTMALs 2151, col. 2) has announced plans
to construct a new integrated facility-including capacity for heavy structurals-with 2
million tons of ingot capacity at a cost of $178 per ton. Findings No. 387. Much of the
cost differential may reflect development of the cheaper and more efficient oxygen con-
verter method of steel production since Bethlehem's estimate was prepared. Barium
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ercising primary jurisdiction, or reviewing an FTC or trial-court decision) 227
would then be obliged to judge whether the magnitude and economic impor-
tance of a particular program countervailed resulting competitive injury. In
Bethlehem, judge Weinfeld viewed expansion of slightly more than one mil-
lion tons in structural-steel capacity as inadequate to warrant merger of two
firms with total capacity of some twenty-four million tons of steel,228 seventy-
five per cent of which they produced and sold in common markets.229 Other
cases would present even more delicate problems of balancing the benefits of
expansion against the detriments of increased concentration which, without
guidance from legislation or legislative history, seem beyond the normal in-
stitutional capacities of courts.230 Finally, a decision that a particular expan-
sion project justified merger would create the necessity of ensuring the pro-
ject's implementation. Swings in the business cycle, stockholder objections,
or management changes, all could cause cancellation or alteration. Perhaps
merger could be made contingent upon expansion,23 1 and the court could re-
tain jurisdiction, as in consent decree proceedings.23 2 But new imponderables
planned to employ this method, 1958 MOODY'S INDUSTRIALs 2846, col. 2, which accounted
for nearly 40% of 1958 industry expansion, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1959, p. 35, col. 3.
National Steel Corp., which ranks almost equal with Youngstown in the industry, 168
F. Supp. at 585, recently announced plans to construct a $300 million plant in Chicago,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1959, p. 45, col. 2. This compares with $358 million estimate for the
proposed expansion of Youngstown's facilities. Brief for Defendants, June 23, 1958, p. 22;
see Bethlehem-Youngstown: Controversial Engagenent, Fortune, June 1957, pp. 145, 188
("with $620 million of assets, Youngstown has substantially the same access to the capital
market as Bethlehem" and smaller steel companies "have financed expansions proportion-
ately much larger").
227. It is probable that the weight to be accorded an expansion program would be
considered a question of law and would not therefore be subject to the limitations imposed
upon court review of findings of fact. See note 193 supra.
228. 168 F. Supp. at 617. The court also emphasized that, in terms of total tonnage,
structural shapes and plates are much less important than those products in which the
defendants are principal competitors-hot rolled sheets, cold rolled sheets, and hot rolled
bars, the three most important products of the steel industry. Ibid.
229. 168 F. Supp. at 586.
230. Cf. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: Tie
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957). But cf. Baltimore & O.R.R., 152 I.C.C.
721 (1929). There, acquisition by the three major East-West trunk lines of a smaller
competitor, 73.4% of whose freight was competitive with that of the three acquiring cor-
porations, was held to violate § 7. The purpose of the acquisition was in part to construct
a joint terminal facility for Cleveland; the acquired railroad owned the necessary prop-
erty but was unwilling, for financial reasons, to join in the terminal project. When the
defendants successfully evaded the divestment decree, by transferring their shares to an-
other corporation which they controlled, a majority of the commissioners reversed them-
selves and held that the public interest in the new terminal outweighed the § 7 violation.
Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 154 I.C.C. 516 (1929). But different considerations should, and
now do, apply in such regulated industries. See note 136 supra.
231. According to the government brief, defense counsel suggested contingent ap-
proval of the Bethlehem-Youngstown merger. Plaintiff's Brief After Trial, pp. 86-87.
232. Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective an Umbrella?, 68 YALE
L.J. 1391, 1392 (1959).
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might well arise in assessing whether deviations warranted revocation of mer-
ger consent. In addition, contingent approval might compel the implementa-
tion of projects which have, before completion, ceased to be economically
desirable or feasible.
In the light of antitrust policy, an expansion-of-capacity defense meets the
same objections as the mergers-for-efficiency argument. 233 The congressional
mandate makes even demonstrable economic benefits irrelevant once competi-
tive tests of the statute have been contravened. 23 4 Mergers which withdraw
an active seller from the market, augment the industry share of the acquiring
corporation, and increase concentration are no less anticompetitive because
they contemplate the assembling of new plant and equipment, thereby adding
to total supply.
A merger which violates section 7 in one market might effectuate an ex-
pansion plan in a separate product or section where the merging firms do not
compete. Consequently, the court's statement in Bethlehem that a statutory
violation in one market renders irrelevant demonstrable benefits in another
may create concern lest minor competitive injury bar major expansion.23 5
Suppose, for example, that a violation of section 7 by competitors in the screw
market would deny them opportunity to unite their resources and produce
rare metals for defense. In practice, however, competing firms in such cir-
cumstances can avoid offending the statute by limiting their collaboration sole-
ly to markets in which they are noncompeting. This could be accomplished
through either a contractual joint venture or a joint subsidiary (an incor-
porated joint venture). According to one estimate, some 345 joint subsidiaries,
owned by the 1,000 largest United States manufacturing corporations, present-
ly exist.23 6 Such subsidiaries are, it seems clear, beyond Sherman or Clayton
Act proscription if their operations do not touch markets in which their
owners compete-provided tacit or formal agreements to divide markets or
not to compete are shunned.23 7 Indeed, joint ventures may introduce robust
233. See notes 171-76 supra and accompanying text.
234. See note 21 supra.
235. 168 F. Supp. 618 ("... if the proscribed effect is visited on one or more rele-
vant markets then it matters not what the claimed benefits may be elsewhere.").
236. 'Martini & Berman, Expansion Via Joint Subsidiaries, in AmERICAN MANAGE-
MENT Ass'N, MERGERS AND AcQuIsiroNs 83, 86-87 (1957).
237. Eaton, Joint Ventures, in How TO COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS 245,
248-49 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954); Hale, Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries
and the Antitrust Laws, 42 VA. L. REv. 927, 933 (1956) ; Whipple, Problems of Com-
binatio--Integration, Intra-Corporate Conspiracy and Joint Ventures, in 1958 ANTITRUST
LAW Symaposiur 34, 57 (CCH 1958); Note, 4 STAN. L. REV. 559 (1952). In United
States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) ff 69250 (S.D.
N.Y. Jan. 22, 1959), the wholly-owned subsidiary of film producer A acquired exclusive
television rights for pre-1948 films of producer B. A preliminary injunction was partially
denied under both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act. Defendants had
contended that they had never competed in the television market.
On the other hand, joint subsidiaries which necessitate "intimate association of ...
principal ... producers in day-to-day manufacturing operations, their exchange of patent
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new sellers into separate markets, decrease concentration, and diminish market
power of established firms. Hence, if the market for heavy structural steel in
Chicago were deemed (as it was not) 238 a separate geographic and product
market, a Youngstown-Bethlehem joint venture-the two companies already
operate some fifteen joint subsidiaries 23-would afford an alternative and
less injurious means of carrying out their expansion.
Mergers for Competition-Problems of Challenging the Dominant Firm
Some defendants have contended that consolidation will allow the new cor-
porate entity to contest the controlling position of a market leader.240 This
argument was pursued in American Crystal Sugar, 41 and particularly in
Bethlehem. In the latter, defendants argued that, only in combination, could
they effectively challenge the preponderant power of United States Steel in
the Chicago and national steel markets.24 (As the government was quick to
demonstrate, however, Bethlehem is itself dominant in some areas and some
products, notably in heavy structural steel.) 243
licenses and industrial know-how, and their common experience in marketing and fixing
prices may inevitably reduce their zeal for competition inter sese" in other markets, and
violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950) (dictum). Apart from this and other cases involving
foreign subsidiaries, the legality of joint ventures has never been litigated. See ATr'Y
GEN. REP,. 88-91.
Sherman Act problems may also arise when joint ventures provide backward vertical
integration into raw materials, Fusfeld, Joint Subsidiaries in. the Iron and Steel Industry,
48 Am. EcoN. REv. 578, 586-87 (Supp. 1958), or forward integration into distribution,
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 151-53, 173-75 (1948) ; United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881. (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; Rostow, Over-all
Size, in How To COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAws 311, 316-17 (Van Cise & Dunn
ed. 1954).
238. Such a market was not discussed by the court since neither the Government nor
defendants proposed it. Structural shapes and plates in Chicago would probably be part
of market of the "iron and steel industry" in "the United States as a whole," however.
168 F. Supp. at 603. Hence, the expansion project would fall within a market in which
defendants are competitors, and a joint subsidiary would raise serious Sherman Act is-
sues. See authorities cited note 237 supra. The final judgment thus prohibits Bethlehem
and Youngstown from carrying out their merger or expansion plan "in whole or in part."
Final Judgment, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., Civ. No. 115-328, S.D.N.Y.,
Dec. 19, 1958.
239. Fusfeld, supra note 237, at 579, 582. The two firms are also associated with eight
other subsidiaries. In addition, Pickands, Mather & Co., which owns sizeable in-
terests in the Youngstown-Bethlehem subsidiaries, operates iron ore facilities owned by
each of the companies individually. Id. at 582.
240. See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 1958, p. 13, col. 4, commenting upon Diamond
Crystal Salt Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) f" 27643 (Dec. 2, 1958).
241. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387,
399 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
242. Brief for Defendants, June 23, 1958, pp. 4-5.
243. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 39. Bethlehem
produces 41% of the -nation's structural shapes and plates against 35% for United States
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But a combination of second-level competitors will be unlikely to "chal-
lenge" the dominant firm. 244 In highly concentrated markets, it is probable
that their relationship would be characterized by more usual oligopoly be-
havior patterns of cooperation and parallelism, giving rise to more powerful
restraints on competition in the remainder of the industry.24r For example, it
defies experience to predict that an increase in industry concentration will
result in more competitive pricing, particularly if an "administered price"
system is already in force in the industry (as is thought to be the case in
steel) .246 Furthermore, whether a "challenge" in fact occurs may turn upon
management's state of mind, and the proposed defense thus comes close to
suggesting a criterion of subjective intent.
Nor will a prospective challenge to market leaders diminish the degree to
which the merger lessens competition within the meaning of section 7. Poten-
tial rivalry with the dominant firm does not refute the withdrawal of a com-
petitor from the market, the accretion in market power, or the increase in in-
dustry concentration. The statute assumes that these factors are anticompeti-
tive, and the contrary argument contradicts the legislation's basic tenets.
If challenge to the dominant firm were established as a defense, a cumulative
merger movement might be initiated or aggravated. Once the competitive
balance in an industry is upset by one merger, other firms will also seek to
combine. Corporate consolidations, therefore, are thought to occur in cycles.24 7
If the number two and number five firms were allowed to combine, for ex-
ample, the number three, four, and six firms would seek merger approval, in
order to challenge both dominant firms. As the Bethlehem court pointed out,
Steel, Findings No. 278, and sells about 20% of all heavy structurals in defendant's "mid-
continent" market area, Findings No. 284. Bethlehem has 70% of industry ingot capacity
in the Eastern Production District of the American Iron and Steel Institute. Findings
No. 38.
One recent study suggests that by "quasi-mergers" through a system of ore-producing
joint subsidiaries, Bethlehem and Youngstown have already succeeded in equalling the
overall industry power of United States Steel. Fusfeld, supra note 237, at 586. Fusfeld
maintains that United States Steel, the Bethlehem-Youngstown group, and a "Cleveland
Group" (including National Steel, Armco, Wheeling, Inland, and Republic) all share
about equal industry control and that the remainder rests with scattered small producers.
Ibid. But see Brief for Defendants, June 23, 1958, p. 11 (United States Steel is "in con-
trol of iron ore supplies" for other producers; Bethlehem itself must buy 50% of its
ore) ; U.S. FTC, REPORT ON THE: CONROL OF IRON ORE (1952). Control of iron ore is
essential to industry power because of the "strictly limited and dwindling supply." BAIN,
BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 153-54 (1956).
244. See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp.
387, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Bethlehem-Youngs-
towvn: Controversial Engagement, Fortune, June 1957, pp. 145, 188.
245. See text at notes 55-74 supra.
246. See authorities cited note 154 supra; 168 F. Supp. at 587 ("There is no real
price competition in the iron and steel industry.").
247. See Kraus, Aferging of Banks May Surge Again, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1959,
§ 3, p. 1, col. 7.
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the result might be a market in which all firms are equal in size to the present
industry leader.2 48
Creation of countervailing centers of private power is not the only means
of challenging a dominant firm. A potential alternative, if the market setting
compels diminution of the leader's power, might be an increased employment
of the Sherman Act.249 This alternative is more in harmony with traditional
antitrust policy.
The merger-for-competition defense has never received judicial support.
Only the Antitrust Division, in approving the small automobile mergers of
1954, has taken it into consideration.250 The Assistant Attorney General em-
phasized that the decision rested upon the absence, in that rather unique in-
dustry setting, of smaller sellers who could be injured. Even so, detriment to
buyers should not be ignored, particularly in a market where new entry is a
remote possibility. Since the automobile mergers would probably not have
violated the statute anyway,251 the Division's reliance upon the challenge-to-
dominant-firms concept is at best dubious administrative dictum which need
not and should not be followed.
248. 168 F. Supp. at 618 ("we head in the direction of triopoly") ; see Fusfeld, supra
note 237.
249. See Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 176,
182 (1955) ("If the economies of scale are not substantial, the proper social policy would
be to dissolve the giant firms rather than to allow mergers of the small."); Markham,
Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 43 VA. L.. REV. 489,
495 (1957).
250. 1955 Hearings 299 (statement of Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral) ("Absent competitive disadvantage to smaller rivals, Congress beyond doubt in-
tended us to consider the merger's effect on small companies' ability to compete with
dominant firms.").
251. See text at notes 167-69 supra.
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